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MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE: A TAX SYSTEM
APPROACH TO FLOOD INSURANCE
CHARLENE LUKE† & AVIVA ABRAMOVSKY‡
***
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has fallen short in
fulfilling its promise as a social safety net for flood loss victims. In place of
the NFIP, this Article proposes a mandatory social insurance plan that
would harness the strengths of the federal taxing authority to provide basic
relief for flood losses occurring at an individual’s primary residence. Any
plan for addressing flood loss must navigate hotly debated, competing
views about government intervention, redistribution, private markets,
environmental protection, and property rights. This Article argues that
government intervention in flood loss relief is inevitable, at least in the
foreseeable future, and that the focus of that intervention should be on the
ex ante provision of a social safety net. The program proposed in this
Article is also intended to provide additional levers for addressing the
complexities of flood loss, including the reduction of negative
environmental externalities, and to provide the impetus needed for
harmonizing existing tax provisions and grant programs.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early on the morning of August 30, 2015, the life of Alice and her
son will change forever when floodwater rips through the ground floor
apartment rented by Alice. Miraculously, Alice will have sufficient
†
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warning of the imminent collapse of a dam that she and her son will be able
to escape with their lives.1 Many of the personal possessions that will be
destroyed in the disaster are irreplaceable — the first baby tooth lost by her
son and saved by Alice, the family photographs that Alice never has had
the time or money to digitize and upload to the cloud, the souvenirs Alice
purchased on a road trip taken many years ago when times were better.
Alice will, however, be able to take some comfort in the knowledge that
with each paycheck she has received over the past three years, she has been
participating in a national flood loss security plan — a plan that will now
help her in making a dignified fresh start.
If, however, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
continues on its present course, the outcome for Alice may well be very
different. Without new legislation, the program will not even exist in 2015;
in 2010 the program briefly lapsed,2 and in 2011 the program has been
extended for multiple short-term periods with the most recent extension
ending on December 23, 2011.3 Even if Congress acts to extend the current
version of the NFIP, Alice will almost certainly not have purchased flood
insurance because of the low participation rates associated with the NFIP.
Instead, Alice will likely be scrambling for ad hoc, piecemeal post-disaster
assistance.4 She may think back to the news coverage of ten years before5
1

See Henry Fountain, Danger Pent Up Behind Aging Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2011, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/science/22da
m.html?pagewanted=all (“[O]f the nation's 85,000 dams, more than 4,400 are
considered susceptible to failure . . . .”).
2
See Rebecca Mowbray, Lapses in National Flood Insurance Program Bring
Policy Renewals to a Halt, NOLA.COM (June 30, 2010, 6:53PM), http://www.n
ola.com/business/index.ssf/2010/06/lapses_in_national_flood_ insur.html.
3
As of December 21, 2011. See Resolution Making Further Continuing
Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 112-68 (extension through Dec. 23, 2011); Resolution
Making Further Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 112-67, 125 Stat. 769
(extension through Dec. 17, 2011); Consolidated & Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55 § 101, 125 Stat. 552 (extension
through Dec. 16, 2011); Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-36
§ 130, 125 Stat. 386 (extension through Nov. 18, 2011); Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-33, 125 Stat. 363 (extension through
Oct. 4, 2011); National Flood Insurance Program Reextension Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-250, 124 Stat. 2630 (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4026)
(extension through Sept. 30, 2011). Additional extensions have been proposed,
including one that would extend the NFIP through May 2012. See H.R. 3628,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 1548, 112th Cong. (2011).
4
See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories:
Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1473
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and realize that she has become trapped in her own version of Hurricane
Katrina.
Flood losses are only likely to escalate in the coming years.6
Before the next massive flood occurs7 — indeed before the next flood that
devastates an individual life occurs — Congress should enact a new
program for flood loss relief that provides a better social safety net than the
current NFIP. This Article suggests a mandatory social insurance plan that

(2007) (“Too often, those who suffer most are the poorest members of society. . .
.”). Cf. Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insurance Against Terrorism—And
Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 277 (2003) (predicting that “public and charitable
relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be) less than
full private insurance.”).
5
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, and the levees failed
on August 30, 2005. See Joseph B. Treaster & N.R. Kleinfield, Hurricane Katrina:
The Overview; New Orleans Is Inundated As 2 Levees Fail; Much of Gulf Coast Is
Crippled; Toll Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005 at A1, available at http://q
uery.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CE4DF1731F932A0575BC0A9639C
8B63&pagewanted=all; Joseph B. Treaster & Kate Zernike, Hurricane Katrina
Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/national/30storm.html?pagewa
nted=all.
6
See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR
WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISK IN A NEW ERA OF
CATASTROPHES 4 (2009) (explaining that “development in hazard-prone areas and
increased value at risk” are key factors and climate change is “of growing
concern”); Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 6 & n. 12 (2006) (describing
how development has increased the cost of floods, though “global warming or
cyclical climate changes may explain part of this increase”).
7
Since the original draft of this article was written, near-record setting water
levels along the Mississippi River have exacted their toll, including the opening of
spillways to flood purposefully rural areas in order to avoid catastrophic losses in
larger metropolitan areas. See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Flooding Takes Vast
Economic Toll, And It’s Hardly Done, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A11;
Campbell Robertson, Louisiana Spillway Opened to Relieve Flooding, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/15spillway.html; A.G.
Sulzberger, As Missouri River Rises, Control Efforts Take Shape, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 2011, at A14. See also CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI
RIVER STORIES: HOW THE ROAD TO UNNATURAL DISASTER IS PAVED WITH WELLINTENDED LAWS (forthcoming 2011), for more on the history of flooding along the
Mississippi River.
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would harness the strengths of the federal taxing authority8 to provide basic
relief for flood losses occurring at an individual’s primary residence.9 Any
plan for addressing flood loss must navigate hotly debated, competing
views about government intervention, redistribution, private markets,
environmental protection, and property rights. This Article argues that
governmental intervention in flood loss relief is inevitable, at least in the
foreseeable future,10 and that the focus of that intervention should be on the
ex ante provision of a social safety net. The program proposed in this
Article is also intended to provide additional levers for addressing the
complexities of flood loss, including the reduction of negative
environmental externalities,11 and to provide the impetus needed for
harmonizing existing tax provisions and grant programs.
Part II of this Article discusses the NFIP’s program for personal
property12 and outlines problems associated with the program. Overall, the
8

See Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy After Hurricane Katrina,
in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 203, 217 (Ronald
J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (briefly raising the possibility of a premium tax
approach and stating that it is a “potentially superior approach”).
9
The business and investment property flood losses will be addressed in a
future Article.
10
See Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835,
875 (2006) (“Although the flood insurance program has serious deficiencies, no
one seriously suggests that management of this market should revert to the
states.”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 536-50 (1986) (discussing market versus government solutions in the
presence of market failure); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4; George L. Priest,
Government Insurances versus Market Insurance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK &
INS. 71 (2003); Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and
Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 89 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds.,
2006). See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) for discussion of the more general
question of when government intervention is appropriate.
11
See Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224, 231-32 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (complete shift of risk to insurer “could lead the insured
to be irresponsible because he or she bears no cost of a loss”).
12
The NFIP also authorizes business coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012;
Commercial Coverage: Business Property Risk, FLOODSMART.GOV,
http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/commercial_coverage/business_prop
erty_risk.jsp (last updated Aug. 25, 2011, 4:18 PM) (overview of currently
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NFIP fails to provide an adequate safety net as numerous individuals
continue to fail to purchase flood insurance.13 If the NFIP were to charge
actuarially fair premiums,14 the resulting increases would likely lead to
even lower participation in the program among those least economically
able to self-insure.15 At the same time, some individuals file repetitive loss
claims, causing a significant financial drain on the program and potentially
exacerbating environmental costs.16 The budget woes of the NFIP are
compounded by the outsourcing of flood insurance sales and claims
adjustments to private insurance companies.17 These private insurance
companies charge the NFIP a flat rate for these services without having to
account for actual costs.18
The NFIP’s problem areas are relatively easy to enumerate, but
the path to crafting a better approach is more complex. Part III discusses
some of the obstacles facing any plan designed to mitigate and compensate
for flood loss. Flood losses are difficult to diversify; individuals have an
incentive to purchase flood insurance only for their most at-risk property;
and individuals may be motivated to take less care in their decisions with
available business coverage). Discussion of NFIP business coverage as well as
business-related tax provisions is outside the scope of this Article.
13
See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Has The Time Come for Comprehensive
Natural Disaster Insurance, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 175 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006) (For Louisiana
parishes hit by Katrina, “the percentages of homeowners with flood insurance
ranged from 57.7 percent . . . to 7.3 percent. . . . Only 40 percent of the residents in
Orleans parish had flood insurance.”).
14
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1063T, NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS
FINANCIAL & OPERATIONAL ISSUE, at 5-6 (2010) (finding that NFIP “is, by design,
not actuarially sound”).
15
See id. at 3 (explaining that taking steps to “make premium rates more
reflective of long-term flood risks . . . . would raise rates and potentially reduce
participation in NFIP.”).
16
See id. at 1 (“Only 1 percent of policies . . . account for 25 to 30 percent of
claims.”).
17
Before the massive flooding of 2011, the NFIP was already deeply in debt,
largely because of the catastrophic losses of the 2005 hurricane season. See id.
(“As of August 2010, NFIP’s debt to Treasury stood at $18.8 billion.”). Before the
2005 hurricane season, the program had generally balanced out. See KUNREUTHER
& MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 110-11.
18
See Aviva Abramovsky, Insurance and the Flood, in LAW AND RECOVERY
FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 83, 97 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009); see
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 8-9.
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respect to flood costs because of the availability of coverage. These three
difficulties — known respectively as correlation,19 adverse selection,20 and
moral hazard21 — represent classic concerns in the formation of insurance
markets. Part III also briefly considers possible cognitive obstacles to the
provision of flood loss relief.22 For example, because flood risks are
difficult to conceptualize, individuals will have problems taking the steps
necessary to engage in adequate preparation, and government officials
charged with aiding community preparation will be subject to the same
challenges.23

19

See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 262 (2002) (explaining that by 1928 “[h]aving learned
that individual flood risks were often highly correlated . . . insurers had apparently
decided that the prospect of catastrophic flooding rendered this particular risk
uninsurable”); Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 820 (2005) (“Natural disasters are highly
correlated, and difficult to ‘uncorrelate’ because those who are not at high risk do
not seek to transfer their risk.”); see also infra Part III.A for discussion regarding
why even national, private insurance companies face correlation difficulties with
respect to flood loss.
20
See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance Adverse Selection and
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 378 (2003) (arguing that “risk
classification itself can create a kind of adverse selection” since insurers may
“select risks in a manner that is adverse to the insurance pool”); Kaplow, supra
note 10, at 543-44 (explaining that pricing to cover high-risk individuals will cause
lower-risk individuals to drop out, which will cause insurance companies to
increase rates again and so motivate even more lower-risk individuals to drop
coverage, and so on until it is possible that “no insurance would be offered”).
21
See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237,
239 (1996) (explaining that in economic literature the term “refers to the tendency
for insurance against loss to reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of
loss.”); Kaplow, supra note 10, at 537 (with insurance “actors have less incentive
to avoid” losses); Kunreuther, supra note 13, at 183 (“[D]isaster assistance is
purported to create a type of Samaritan’s dilemma: providing assistance after a
catastrophe reduces the economic incentives of potential victims to invest in
protective measures prior to a disaster.”).
22
See infra Part III.B.
23
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (“A rational, risk-neutral consumer
would purchase coverage at an actuarially fair price that is equivalent to the
expected loss. . . . In practice, the story is apparently not that simple.”); Kaplow,
supra note 10, at 548 (stating that the “strongest case for some government
response to risk is presented by situations in which certain actors underestimate the
likelihood of loss”).
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Part IV argues that utilizing tax system components may provide
a strong course for meeting the complexities of flood loss coverage and
mitigation, though it also discusses the challenges that would face such an
approach. Additionally, Part IV presents an outline of such a tax-system
infused flood loss security program. The proposed program would be
administered jointly by the Treasury (IRS) and Homeland Security
(FEMA) and would mandate minimum coverage for all individuals as to
the contents of their primary residences.24 Coverage for a home’s structure
would also be mandatory but should be designed to limit repetitive loss
claims. Rewards as well as penalties could be built into the system in order
to better manage flood preparation and community participation. For
example, the proposed flood security plan could charge rates that allow for
tax refunds in the case of good results — e.g., no claim filed in a particular
year.25 Income tax refunds appear to be highly satisfying given the amount
of over-withholding that occurs in the income tax system.26
Part V explores the current patchwork of tax rules as they relate
to post-disaster assistance, pre-disaster flood mitigation grant programs,
and insurance payouts. Part V also recommends steps for harmonizing
these rules with the proposed flood loss security program. Part VI is a brief
conclusion.
II. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)27 is administered by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),28 which is a part of
the Department of Homeland Security. The NFIP has roots dating back to
the early 1950s29 and the early legislation introduced structural components
24

Mandates have long been recognized as a solution to the adverse selection
problem. See infra Part III.A. If such a mandate is, however, politically
unpalatable, coverage could be mandatory for high and moderate risk residences
while opt-out coverage could be available for lower-risk residences. See infra Part
IV.B.
25
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238 (describing insureds’
preference for rebates over deductibles).
26
See Lee Anne Fennell, Hyperopia in Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 141, 148-52 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
27
42 U.S.C. §§ 4011-31 (2006).
28
See 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a).
29
See HOWARD KUNREUTHER & DOUGLAS C. DACY, THE ECONOMICS OF
NATURAL DISASTERS 259 (1969), for more on the history behind the NFIP; MOSS,
supra note 19, at 262-63; Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92; David A. Grossman,
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that, while well intentioned, contribute to the weakness of the NFIP today.
This Part provides an overview of the current state of the program.
A. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
Early flood insurance legislation attempted to motivate
communities to take flood mitigation steps by tying the availability of
insurance coverage to community adherence to floodplain management
regulations.30 Even today, individuals are not able to participate in the
NFIP unless their communities agree to abide by various regulations
intended to mitigate flood loss.31 As to communities who fail to participate,
federal grants, disaster relief, and federal mortgage insurance are
“unavailable for the acquisition or construction of structures located or to
be located” in high-risk areas.32 Currently, over twenty thousand
Flood Insurance: Can a Feasible Program be Created?, 34 LAND ECON. 352
(1958).
30
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102 (2006) (community participation
requirements). The regulatory requirements are extensive. See 44 C.F.R. pts. 60,
64; FEMA, Floodplain Management Requirements: A Study Guide and Desk
Reference for Local Officials, FEMA (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.fema.go
v/plan/prevent/floodplainfm_sg.shtm; Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92.
31
42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (2006); see Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood
Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 131 (1998) (Howard
Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr., eds.) (discussing responsibility of local
community in “adopting and enforcing these floodplain management standards”).
Relatively few individuals would be affected by the non-participation of the local
community because “[m]ost flood-prone communities that have elected not to
participate are communities whose areas of serious flood risk are either very small
or have few if any structures.” Id. at 129; FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 2 (2007),
available at www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2954 (“If a community
does not participate in the program, property owners in that jurisdiction are not
able to purchase federally backed flood insurance.”). Individuals living in nonparticipating communities would have to rely on post-flood government assistance
or on the virtually nonexistent private flood insurance market. Abramovsky, supra
note 18, at 126 (“[P]rivate insurers do write limited amounts of flood coverage,
usually for commercial insureds”).
32
See 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (2006); see also FEMA, supra note 31, at 2. A 1968
Act did contain a short-lived penalty at the individual level that had community
participation implications: if the individual’s community participated and the
individual failed to purchase flood insurance coverage after one year, then such
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communities participate.33 Since 1990 communities have also been able to
elect to comply with stronger standards through the Community Rating
System.34 Participation in the Community Rating System program yields
credits that have the effect of reducing flood insurance premiums
throughout the community.35 Currently, nearly twelve hundred
communities participate in the Community Rating System program, which
while representing only 5 percent of all NFIP communities includes
approximately 67 percent of NFIP policyholders.36 In spite of widespread
community participation, individual residents will not necessarily have
flood insurance because, as will be discussed more fully in the next section,
purchase of coverage is largely optional.37
Participation by a community in the NFIP does not, of course,
ensure that a local community is actually compliant.38 FEMA must
determine whether local building codes and permitting processes on their
face adhere to the federal guidelines and must also examine whether
communities actually follow facially adequate ordinances.39 Communities
may further complicate FEMA’s job by pushing back against guidelines

individuals were to be denied post-flood federal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 4021
(repealed); see also Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 92-93.
33
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 4.
34
42 U.S.C. § 4022(b); see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 135-36
(describing system).
35
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 135. Credits are based on “estimated
reduction in flood and erosion damage risks resulting from the measures adopted
by the community under the program.” 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b)(3).
36
Email from William L. Trakimas, Director of Natural Hazards (Sept. 8,
2011) (on file with authors) (“Currently 1192 communities participate nationwide .
. . receiv[ing] a discount which is about $292M annually.”). In 1998, roughly 900
communities participated, which similarly represented 5 percent of NFIP
communities but included over 63 percent of NFIP policyholders. Pasterick, supra
note 31, at 137.
37
See infra Part II.B.
38
See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that
“25 percent of the insured losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 could have been
prevented through better building code compliance and enforcement”); see also
Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2006) (describing how many
local governments fail to enforce the minimum building requirements need to
participate in the NFIP).
39
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131.
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whose implementation they perceive to be too costly.40 New floodplain
management regulations often contain transition rules or grandfather
provisions,41 possibly in order to minimize political fallout. The political
dimensions of putting a community on probation or pulling NFIP
eligibility42 may also constrain enforcement.43
Even assuming full compliance with floodplain regulations, the
regulations, in conjunction with other flood loss mitigation programs, may
have unintended consequences. Individuals may be overly confident in the
ability of federal, state, and local authorities to manage flood loss through
artificial containment and diversion projects and thus increase the direct
and externalized costs of floods. That is, development may increase in
areas that have been rendered “safe” through community planning.44
(Alternatively, development may occur first under the assumption that with

40

See Peter G. Gosselin, On Their Own in Battered New Orleans, in ON RISK
15, 22-23 (Ronald J. Daniels
et al., eds., 2006) (describing among New Orleans residents that regulation changes
would make it difficult to maintain flood insurance eligibility); see also DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 343-47, 473 (2003) (describing formation of interest
groups and agency capture).
41
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 14.
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 4023 (2006) (disallowing flood insurance coverage for
communities violating state and local land use law); 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (2010)
(suspension regulations); 44 C.F.R. § 61.16 (2010) (additional premium charged in
communities on probation); 44 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2010) (violations of state and local
zoning law); see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (describing probation and
suspension process).
43
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (“[T]here has never been a
comprehensive assessment of the level of compliance nationwide or of the overall
effect of program standards on local development patterns.”).
44
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing how
government actions may make residents feel safe when in fact they remain
vulnerable); Burby, supra note 38, at 176 (federal policy in New Orleans
contributed “directly to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina” by encouraging
development in hazardous areas and diverting resources away from areas that
could have benefitted from improvements); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1518
(describing the “foolhardiness of . . . attempting to keep the water away from the
people through artificial flood control”); Scales, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing how
“[f]lood control projects merely buy time” but also attract “[r]esidential and
commercial development . . . often resting on long-term assumptions about the
suitability of the area for development”).
AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA
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increased development, loss mitigation will be undertaken.45) Individual
homeowners and renters may then rely not only on visible governmental
mitigation efforts but may be further reassured by the presence of
developers. If, however, the safety measures fail (or fail to materialize) the
flood costs will be even higher because of the increased development.46
The failure of the levees in New Orleans is among the most vivid examples
of the risk of relying on manmade structures to turn back nature.47
Although individuals residing in New Orleans had the option to purchase
flood insurance, the majority of residents did not do so and were not
required to do so48 (the same would almost certainly hold true in any U.S.
community49). Individuals may well not have understood that risk was still
present in spite of (or because of) the levees.50
45

Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POLITICAL ECON. 473, 477 (1977) (“[T]he
rational agent knows that, if he and others build houses there [in the flood plain],
the government will take the necessary flood-control measures. Consequently, in
the absence of a law prohibiting the construction of houses in the flood plain,
houses are built there, and the army corps of engineers subsequently builds the
dams and levees.”); see also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at
262 (describing Nobel Prize-winning work of Kydland and Prescott, including
flood plain example showing “that a discretionary policy, which may be optimal
given the current situation, may not necessarily result in a socially optimal policy
in the longer run”).
46
See generally Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4; Scales, supra note 6, at 13
(“[F]loodplain management (rather than floodplain abandonment) encouraged
development and, thus, concentrated rather than dispersed economic risks of
flooding.”).
47
The 2011 flooding along the Mississippi river is also illustrative of this
lesson. See Editorial, A New Flood, Some Old Truths: The Mississippi Tells Us,
Again, To Change The Way We Manage Water, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, at A22
(“Years of mismanagement of the vast Mississippi River ecosystem—the relentless
and often inadvisable construction of levees and navigation channels, the paving
over of wetlands, the commercial development of flood plains . . . have made the
damage worse than it might otherwise have been. . . . Nobody ever beats the
river.”).
48
See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 877 (“[T]he percentage of homes
with flood insurance policies in coastal parishes of Louisiana affected by Hurricane
Katrina ranged from 7% in St. James Parish to 57.7% in St. Bernard Parish, with
only 40% of homes in Orleans Parish having this coverage.”); Scales, supra note 6,
at 15 (“[F]ewer than one-in-ten residents along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi are
believed to have held flood insurance prior to Katrina.”).
49
See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S
MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvi (2006)
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While flood mitigation programs have unintended consequences,
halting mitigation programs is likely to be even more problematic. First,
mitigation does work51 albeit only up to a point — though often an
unknown point at that. Second, outright prohibitions on development by the
federal government are problematic,52 and once development has occurred,
and if the potential disaster is big enough, the federal government will find
it politically untenable to fail to provide any mitigation.53 Even assuming
developers understand the riskiness of their building projects, they may be
able to shift the flood risk to the ultimate owners and tenants,54 who are
sure to elicit (and likely to deserve) a more sympathetic response than the
original developers. Thus, continuance of flood mitigation programs,
including community participation, appears to be an uneasy necessity,
though steps could clearly be taken to use mitigation more judiciously and
development prohibitions less sparingly.55 As will be discussed in Part IV,
even though this Article does not directly address the role of developers
(“Even though approximately one-third of NFIP policies are written outside
SFHAs [high-risk areas], the market penetration rate outside SFHAs is only about
1 percent.”).
50
See infra Part III.B (discussing possible reasons, including cognitive
shortcuts and biases, for low participation in flood insurance).
51
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing how flood plain
regulations have, at least in the Midwest, “discourage[d] floodplain development
through the increased costs in meeting floodplain management requirements and
the cost of an annual flood insurance premium”); David Welky, When the Levee
Doesn’t Break, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2011, at A25 (arguing that “the extent of the
[2011 Mississippi flood] damage probably won’t come close to the losses of life
and property seen in the historic flood of January 1937. . . .—proof that after nearly
75 years, the federal government has finally gained the upper hand on a river
system once thought uncontrollable.”).
52
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131 (noting rejection by NFIP of federal
override of local regulation because the NFIP “has consistently taken the position
that federal land use regulation at the local level is illegal, and, in any case, would
be unworkable”).
53
See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 45, at 477 (theorizing that the “the
rational agent knows that, if he and others build houses there [in the flood plain],
the government will take the necessary flood-control measures”).
54
Cf. Pasterick, supra note 31, at 131-32 (discussing report in Midwest
suggesting that “[d]evelopers have the added incentive of wanting to avoid
marketing flood-prone property.”).
55
See id. at 154 (noting “vital connection between the availability of flood
insurance and the local community enforcement of floodplain management
provisions”).
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and other commercial enterprises, integrating residential flood loss
coverage with the tax system could provide an opportunity to craft
additional levers for balancing social safety net concerns with constraints
on unwise development.
B. INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION
Individuals are required to purchase flood insurance only in a
limited set of circumstances. Regulated lending institutions,56 governmentsponsored enterprises for housing (e.g., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and
federal agency lenders57 must require flood insurance as a condition to
closing on loans secured by property in high-risk flood zones.58 “High-risk”
indicates that there is a 1% or greater chance of a flood in a particular
year59 — that is, the property lies within the one-hundred year flood plain.
56

42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(10) (2006) (includes “any bank, savings and loan
association, credit union, farm credit bank, Federal land bank association,
production credit association, or similar institution subject to the supervision on a
Federal entity for lending regulation”). The statute directs the federal entities for
lending regulation to promulgate regulations applicable to these institutions. These
federal entities have adopted such regulations. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 22 (2010) (by
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 208.25 (2010) (Federal
Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. pt. 339 (2010) (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation); 12 C.F.R. pt. 572 (2010) (Office of Thrift Supervision); 12 C.F.R. §
614.4920 (2010) (Farm Credit Administration); 12 C.F.R. pt. 760 (2010) (National
Credit Union Administration).
57
42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(7) (2006) (defining these agencies as “Federal
agenc[ies] that makes direct loans secured by improved real estate or a mobile
home”). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 26 (entities include Federal Housing
Administration, Small Business Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs,
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
58
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2006) (lender mandate); 42 U.S.C. § 4104a (2006)
(notice requirements). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 2-4 (the only lenders and
services excluded are those “who are not federally regulated and that do not sell
loans to . . . Fannie Mae . . . Freddie Mac,” or other government-sponsored
entities.).
59
FEMA literature often uses the term “special flood hazard area” but “Highrisk flood areas” and “special flood hazard areas” are synonymous. Compare U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 14, at 14 with FEMA, supra note 31, at
GLS 9.
This is also called the 100-year flood plain. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2010)
(defining “100-year flood” as “the flood having a one percent chance of being
equaled or exceeded in any given year”); FEMA, supra note 31, at GLS 9. But
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All mapped areas with lower than 1% chance per year of flooding are in
low or moderate-risk zones;60 yet such zones historically lead to about 25
percent of NFIP claims.61 Since relatively few individuals purchase
insurance if they reside outside a high-risk zone, such policies constitute
such a significant portion of NFIP claims suggests that the 1% benchmark
is problematic.62
The lender mandate does not apply to properties outside of highrisk flood zones. The requirement also does not apply to properties located
in non-participating communities since individuals in those areas are not
eligible to purchase flood insurance.63 Under the most recent changes to the
such terminology can mislead individuals into thinking that a flood will only occur
once in a hundred years and is downplayed (or eliminated) in public education
information. See Pasterick, supra note 1, at 130 (“The term ‘100-year flood’ is
problematic for the NFIP. It is a term of convenience intended to convey
probability but has had the adverse effect of giving floodplain residents, who tend
to interpret it in chronological terms, a false sense of security.”).
FEMA has attempted to help people understand the risk assessments by
anchoring this to a more readily understood marker: the 30-year mortgage. Thus,
its public education website explains that high-risk “equates to a 26% chance of
flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage.” Nat’l Flood Ins. Program,
FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NFIP, (last visited Aug. 25, 2011,
4:17 PM), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/.
60
Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE
NFIP, (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://www.floodsmart.gov/floo
dsmart.
61
FEMA, supra note 31, at 5.
62
This estimate may be too low. See Burby, supra note 38, at 177 (stating that
“most flood losses in the United States stem from less frequent flood events” and
citing studies suggesting a range of 66% to 83% of losses arising from areas
outside the one-hundred-year flood zone). The Association of State Floodplain
Managers has recommended that a five-hundred-year flood plain be used as the
better benchmark for levees. ASSOCIATION OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS,
NATIONAL FLOOD POLICY CHALLENGES: LEVEES: THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 3-5
(2007), available at http://www.floods.org/PDF/ASFPM_Levee_Policy_Challe
nges_White_Paper.pdf. See also Burby, supra note 38, at 177 (discussing proposal
by Association of State Floodplain Managers).
63
FEMA, supra note 31, at 5. In the case of a non-participating community, “a
lender is still required to inspect any flood maps to determine flood hazard risk and
provide notice of such risk.” Id. at 2. See 42 U.S.C. 4106(b) (2006) (requiring
regulations on notice). Prior to 1977, regulated lending was prohibited in
communities that did not participate. The change was implemented by statute.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-128 § 703(a), 91
Stat. 1144. See also FEMA, supra note 31, app. at 1-3.
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NFIP in 2004, lender–mandated insurance must remain in force over the
life of the loan64 and must be monitored by loan servicers for loans sold to
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.65 Various specific rules have been enacted to
facilitated compliance.66 For example, if the loan requires an escrow—for
example, for real property taxes or homeowner’s insurance — flood
insurance premiums are also required to be escrowed.67
FEMA has no statutory authority to enforce this lender mandate;68
instead, each agency with direct oversight over the covered lender is to
enforce the requirement.69 A 2006 study done by RAND estimated national
compliance with the mandate at 75-80 percent, but with significant
variation across regions.70 Given the recent turmoil in the lending and
housing market, including problems with administrative agency oversight
and complicated securitization structures, it seems fair to wonder about the
extent to which these lender flood insurance mandates have been working
in recent years.71 For high-risk properties not covered by the lender
64

FEMA, supra note 31, at 5.
Id. at 25.
66
See generally id. at 23-60.
67
42 U.S.C. § 4012a(d) (2006). See FEMA, supra note 31, at 39 (discussing
requirement).
68
FEMA, supra note 31, at vii. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (2006).
69
See supra note 56 (citing regulatory provisions and listing these agencies);
FEMA, supra note 31, at 59-60 (Civil penalties may be assessed. “As of November
30, 2006, a total of 119 banks had been assessed nearly $1.3 million in penalties,
for various violations of the 1994 Reform Act.” Regulators may also impose other
sanctions including “unsatisfactory bank ratings, memoranda of understanding,
and, ultimately, cease and desist orders.” Private individuals, including borrowers,
have no cause of action against lenders who have failed to enforce the mandate.).
70
DIXON ET AL., supra note 49. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules
Rather Than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK
UNCERTAINTY 101, 107 (2006) (discussing evidence that suggesting “that some
banks, which were expected to enforce the requirements that individuals in highhazard areas purchase flood coverage, looked the other way.”); Scales, supra note
6, at 14-15 (discussing RAND study and other scholarship on takeup rates). The
failure of lenders independently to require flood insurance is a mystery,
particularly given their insistence on general casualty insurance. See also Scales,
supra note 6, at 17-19 (discussing possible theories for lender behavior with
respect to flood insurance).
71
See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Without Loan Giants, 30-Year Mortgage
May Fade Away, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2
011/03/04/business/04housing.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Without%20Loan%20giants
,%2030-year%20mortgage%20may%20may%20fade%20away&st+cse (discussing
65
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mandate, the same RAND study estimated approximately a 50% take-up
rate.72
In addition to the lender mandate, the NFIP has only one additional
means of applying legal pressure on an individual’s decision to purchase
coverage. Under the current NFIP, individuals may receive government
assistance after a disaster even if they were eligible for, but failed, to
purchase flood insurance, but a condition of the assistance is that the
individual purchase flood insurance in the future. Failure to purchase
insurance then can be used to withhold assistance if flood loss help again
becomes necessary.73 Whether this penalty is actively enforced is another
question,74 particularly in the immediate aftermath of high-impact events.75
The NFIP has no ability to deny coverage if individuals are eligible
to purchase the insurance.76 As a result of repetitive losses, the GAO
possible demise of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac and resulting changes to the
housing market).
72
DIXON ET AL., supra note 49, at xvi.
73
42 U.S.C. § 5154(b); see also FEMA, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing
requirement); Pasterick, supra note 31, at 153 (discussing history of this
requirement and noting it “has its greatest potential impact on grant recipients, who
are generally in lower-income categories than those receiving loans and thus less
likely to be able to afford insurance. Whether the threat of denial of future federal
assistance will have the intended effect of promoting insurance purchase among
this segment of the population remains to be seen.”).
74
See Scales, supra note 6, at 13 (“[T]he NFIP’s enforcement mechanisms are
limited and not credibly invoked.”).
75
See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 292-93 n.82 (predicting “that public
sympathy and interest-group pressure would make enforcement of that restrictive
very difficult”).
76
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 1. Contra Scales,
supra note 6, at 33-34 (stating the NFIP does however, rigidly deny claims filed
more than 60 days after a loss, even though the difficulties involved in a flood
make filing the Paperwork difficult − perhaps especially for less sophisticated
individuals). But see 16 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006) (establishing these systems); 42
U.S.C. § 4028 (stating the NFIP is not available in certain zones designated as with
the Coastal Barrier Resources System); Emergency Management and Assistance
44 C.F.R. §§ 71.1, 71.3 (2010) (implementing regulations); Pasterick, supra note
31, at 146-47 (discussing history of legislation); id. at 146 (stating the Legislation
applies primarily to zones within barrier islands); id. at 146 (stating communities
may have some areas within such zones and others outside, and “[c]onsistent
enforcement . . . is difficult . . . [and] the NFIP must depend on the vigilance of
insurance agents to distinguish which areas of a community are eligible for
coverage and which are not.”) (alteration in the original); id. at 146-47 (“A review
conducted in 1992 by the General Accounting [sic] Office (GAO) found not only
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estimates one percent of policies “account for 25 to 30 percent of claims.”77
The dollar amounts associated with repetitive loss claims are, of course,
only part of the true cost of such claims since frequently such properties are
built in environmentally fragile locations.78
Although the NFIP covers a relatively low number of individuals,
the 2005 hurricane season’s demands on the NFIP were staggering and
overwhelmed the NFIP. FEMA had to invoke its authority to borrow funds
from the U.S. Treasury and seek additional appropriations.79 As of August
2010, FEMA’s debt stood at $18.8 billion;80 it remains unlikely that the
program will be able to repay this amount.81 The billions in payouts made
under the NFIP are still small, however, in comparison to the total cost to
the government of the disaster.82
C. COVERAGE LIMITS, FLOOD MAPS, AND RATES
The maximum coverage currently available under the NFIP is
$100,000 for personal property and $250,000 for residential real estate.83
The premium rate structure varies with coverage, deductible, and, most
importantly, the risks associated with the property to be insured.84 The
highest sample premium ($5,903) listed on FEMA’s website is for a coastal
area, high-risk residence and contents insured for the full available
coverage with a $2,000 deductible.85 Individuals may purchase coverage
that significant new development continued to occur in certain CBRS units after
the law was enacted, but also that NFIP coverage was written on 9 percent of the
residences in the units sampled.”).
77
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 1.
78
See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1508-10 (discussing the “value of
healthy wetlands”).
79
42 U.S.C. §§ 4016, 4017(b)(1), (b)(3), 4127; see Burby, supra note 38, at
177 (discussing past history of operating losses and use of this authority);
Pasterick, supra note 31, at 138-39 (discussing the same).
80
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5, 14.
81
Id. at 5.
82
See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 876-77 (“[T]otal government
expenditures could eventually exceed $200 billion.”).
83
42 U.S.C. §§ 4013-4015 (statutory authorization for setting various
coverage terms and rates); see also Residential Coverage Policy Rates,
FLOODSMART.GOV (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www/floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/r
esidential_coverage/policy-rates.jsp.
84
See Emergency Management and Assistance, 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 (2010)
(coverage, rates & deductibles).
85
See Residential Coverage Policy Rates, supra note 83.
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only for residences and their contents.86 Thus, cars are not covered,87 but
there is no limit to the number of residences for which an individual may
purchase flood insurance.88 Special restrictions do apply to basements and
lower-level crawlspaces.89 Further, “flood” under the NFIP generally does
not cover subsidence90 (which, incidentally, leaves a gap in coverage
availability since private insurers also generally exclude subsidence91).
Although individuals under-purchase flood insurance, possibly
because of perceptions that the rates are too high,92 in fact even the full risk
rates charged are not actuarially sound.93 FEMA is charged with
maintaining flood risk maps,94 but such mapping is difficult given the
contingencies that must be modeled and the costs involved in generating
accurate assessments. Maps cannot remain static since flood risks will
change over time both through natural occurrences and manmade
development. Many FEMA maps are badly in need of updating and also
often fail to take into account important risks.95
In addition to any scientific or budgetary difficulties surrounding
the creation of accurate flood maps, after updates, if FEMA changes maps,

86

See 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 App. A (2)-(3) (stating that renters insurance is
available as well as condo insurance).
87
Residential Coverage: What’s Covered, FLOODSMART.GOV, http://www.floo
dsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/residential_coverage/whats_covered.jsp (last visited
Aug. 25, 2011).
88
Residential Coverage: Policy Rates, supra note 83 (“Single-family
dwellings that are primary residences and insured to the maximum amount of
insurance available under the program or no less than 80% of the replacement cost
at the time of may qualify for replacement cost claim settlement. All other
buildings and contents will be adjusted based on their Actual Cash Value
(depreciated cost).”).
89
Residential Coverage: What’s Covered, supra note 87.
90
Contra 44 C.F.R. pt. 61 App. A(1) § II(A) (Coverage is, however, available
for “subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of water as a
result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding
anticipated cyclical levels that result in a flood . . . .”).
91
See Scales, supra note 6, at 35.
92
See infra Part III.B.
93
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5-6.
94
42 U.S.C. §§ 4101(a), (e)-(i) (2006) (requiring establishment and
publication of information about flood risk zones); see also 44 C.F.R. § 64.3
(description of flood insurance maps); 44 C.F.R. pt. 65 (special hazard mapping).
95
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 7; see also
Pasterick, supra note 31, at 144-46 (describing problem of erosion in general).
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FEMA will often be viewed as the proverbial bearer of bad news.96 As
discussed above, rate increases or more stringent floodplain management
requirements may have political repercussions,97 and FEMA has generally
adopted the administrative practice of grandfathering in current
policyholders to the prior rate.98 In addition to administratively crafted
grandfathering rules, subsidized rates are required by statute to apply to
policyholders who own “structures that were built before floodplain
management regulations were established.”99 These structures date to the
origination of the NFIP, and even forty-plus years later, nearly 25 percent
of NFIP policies receive these subsidized rates.100 These properties also
“experience as much as five times more flood damage than compliant new
structures that are charged full-risk rates.”101
D. OUTSOURCING AND THE NFIP
The federal government sets the flood insurance terms and bears
all of the risks associated with the program, marketing, sales, yet claims
adjustments are increasingly handled by private insurers through the “Write
Your Own” (WYO) Program.102 Under the program, for example, a
policyholder could buy flood insurance from Allstate although the actual
product is only available through the NFIP.103
Utilization of private insurance companies to participate in the
flood insurance program may have been intended to help market the
96

NFIP statute and regulations require consultation with local officials and the
regulations provide various procedures for appealing flood elevation and other
flood map determinations. 42 U.S.C. § 4107; 44 C.F.R. pt.66 (consultation with
local officials); 44 C.F.R. pt. 67 (flood elevation determination appeals); 44 C.F.R.
pt. 68 (administrative hearing procedures); 44 C.F.R. pt. 70 (procedures for map
correction); 44 C.F.R. pt. 72 (procedures and fees for processing map changes).
97
See supra Part II.A.
98
See supra Part II.A.
99
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 6; see 42 U.S.C. §
4015.
100
Id. at 5-6; see also Pasterick, supra note 31, at 132-34 (describing
subsidized rates applicable to pre-flood-insurance-rate-map structures); Scales,
supra note 6, at 16 (“As of this writing, 38 years have passed, and approximately
28% [in 2006] of NFIP policies remain subsidized. This in fact reflects substantial
progress, as the subsidization rate was originally 70%.”) (alteration in the original).
101
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5-6.
102
42 U.S.C. § 4081; 44 C.F.R. § 62.23; see Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 96
(describing WYO program); Scales, supra note 6, at 14 (describing the same).
103
Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 96.
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program and provide better information to individuals regarding their
financial alternatives.104 WYO policies have increased dramatically as a
percentage of flood insurance purchases.105 By September 2008, ninety
WYO insurance companies administered almost ninety-seven percent of
approximately 5.6 million policies in force.106 By comparison, in 1986,
forty-eight WYO companies handled just under half of all policies.107
While WYO policies may be a high percentage of the total outstanding
policies, it is not clear whether the WYO has indeed helped increase total
participation since participation in the NFIP remains low.108
In creating the WYO program, the federal government may also
have been seeking to lower its administrative costs.109 But if so, the
program is flawed. The WYO companies are paid a flat rate and are not
required to account for actual costs incurred.110 The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) studied the difference between the fee
received and actual costs for six WYO insurers from 2005 through 2007
and found “that the payments exceeded actual expenses by $327.1 million,
or 16.5 percent of total payments made.”111 The GAO has also determined
that WYO insurers “did not strategically market the product” in spite of a

104

See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (explaining that
WYO was supposed to be a win-win allowing the NFIP to benefit from marketing
by private insurance); Scales, supra note 6, at 14 (“The WYO program seemed an
ideal way to remedy the NFIP’s persistent failure to sell many flood policies.”).
105
Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 97.
106
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-455, FLOOD
INSURANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE WYO
PROGRAM 3 (2009) (Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate), available at http://www.gao.g
ov/new.items/d09455.pdf.
107
Id. at 3; see also Abramovsky , supra note 18, at 97.
108
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (“Despite this
potentially synergistic effort between the NFIP and private companies, take-up
rates for flood insurance have historically been low.”); Scales, supra note 6, at 1415 (discussing participation rates and stating that “the inception of the WYO
program had a very modest impact on flood insurance participation”).
109
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 3-4.
110
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 83 (“More than
thirty percent of each dollar paid for flood insurance coverage goes to private
insurers . . . . Over the period of 1968 to 2005, these private insurers received over
$7.4 billion (excluding the loss adjustment expenses for which we do not have
data) in fees.”); Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 97.
111
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 9.
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bonus structure that was added to the standard flat-rate compensation
system.112
In addition to the problems that arise in having WYO insurers
market both their own policies and government policies, WYO will also act
as the adjusters for both their private policies and the government policies
in the aftermath of a disaster.113 Thus, the same insurer will be deciding
whether to categorize damage as flood damage (covered by the NFIP) or as
wind damage (covered by private insurance).114 In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, press accounts reported that the WYO companies
boosted flood claims in order to minimize wind damage payouts.115
III. NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS
Currently, there is no private market in basic flood insurance as the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has preempted the field. Even if
path dependence did not all but dictate continued government intervention,
the development of a large market in unsubsidized, private flood insurance

112

Id. (commenting that the bonus structure is not aligned with the NFIP goals
of “increasing penetration in low-risk flood zones and among homeowners in all
zones that do not have mortgages from federally regulated lenders”).
113
See Scales, supra note 6, at 33-34 (describing “disappointing” quality of
help by adjusters in completing NFIP claims, which must be filed within sixty days
of the loss).
114
See Gene Taylor, Federal Insurance Reform after Katrina, 77 MISS. L.J.
783, 786-87 (2008) (describing conflict and explaining that exacerbating the
problem, at the instigation of the WYO companies, the NFIP implemented an
expedited claims procedure after Katrina which allowed WYO companies to issue
flood insurance checks “without apportioning the amount of wind and flood
damage to structures with losses from both perils”). It also, however, became more
difficult to obtain windstorm coverage in the aftermath of Katrina. Id. at 789-90.
(Congressman Taylor did introduce legislation that would expand the NFIP to
include windstorm.) See also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at
41-43 (describing the “wind-water controversy” and the Katrina-related lawsuits);
Scales, supra note 6, at 24-29 (describing Katrina cases, including insurance
companies’ interpretation of contract provisions yielding non-coverage for losses
partially caused by flood and partially by wind).
115
See id. at 787-88 nn.14-15 (discussing press accounts in the Biloxi Sun
Herald and Times Picayune); see also Scales, supra note 6, at 36-37 (describing an
insurer’s “unusually attractive opportunity to recharacterize wind losses as flood
losses as it is the very entity tasked with investigating flood claims for the
government.”).
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is in doubt.116 A private insurer would have to navigate multiple obstacles
in setting a price that would be both actuarially sound and profitable 117
That price would almost certainly be viewed as too expensive by many
individuals,118 including those who would be most in need of assistance
following a flood.119 The first section of this Part reviews those pricing
obstacles, including the extent to which universal coverage could alleviate
those pressures. In addition, the section discusses the concern that universal
coverage could increase moral hazard problems, including negative
environmental externalities. The second section of this Part focuses on the
consumer side of flood insurance and explores the puzzling reality that,
even at subsidized rates, many individuals fail to plan for flood loss by
purchasing insurance.
A. PROVIDER PERILS
Three well-known obstacles complicate the provision of flood
insurance: correlation, adverse selection, and moral hazard. Universal
116

See MOSS, supra note 19, at 262 (describing failed private flood insurance
experiments of the 1890s and 1920s); Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 857
(arguing that “major disasters . . . require significant federal involvement for
response and recovery”).
117
See Boardman, supra note 19, at 828 (“The primary problem for flood
insurance is cost, not calculation.”); Scales, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that
flood insurance “suffers from unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that
make it a relatively difficult market for insurers, and they have responded
rationally by avoiding it”).
118
See infra Part III.B for a discussion of possible explanations rooted in
cognitive psychology; see also Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 239 (explaining
that flood loss risks are “underestimated systematically by homeowners in hazardprone areas” and that residents will perceive “actuarially ‘fair’ coverage” as
“overpriced, and will remain uninsured”).
119
See Debra Lyn Bassett, Place, Disasters, and Disability, in LAW AND
RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 51, 64-69 (Robin Paul Malloy
ed., 2009) (discussing rural poverty, including the “vulnerability of the rural
disabled”); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1473 (“Too often, those who suffer
most are the poorest members of society.”); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at
317 (“Inner-city property owners, including businesses and homeowners, selfinsure far more than their counterparts in affluent areas, in part because of
availability problems.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, Still Up on the Roof: Race, Victimology,
and the Response to Hurricane Katrina, in HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S
UNNATURAL DISASTER 183, 184-87 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker, eds.,
2009).
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coverage should provide some relief as to the first and essentially sidestep
the second. Moral hazard is more complicated, and expanded coverage
would likely trigger concern that such coverage increases moral hazard
problems, including environmental impacts.
1. Correlation
Flood losses are typically highly correlated.120 That is, they
generally occur simultaneously for a large swath of individuals. Thus, even
if it is scientifically well established that a particular area suffers from a 1
in 100 chance of a flood in any particular year,121 if this year happens to be
the year, all of the losses will occur at once. An insurance company may
not yet have established sufficient reserves through receipt of premiums to
cover the losses.122 Insurance companies operating within more limited
geographic areas could face an even more concentrated correlation
problem.123
In order to deal with a correlation problem, a commercial insurance
company would have to charge front-loaded premiums to create a large
reserve in case the low probability event occurred early in the life of the
120

See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 843 (explaining that flood risks are
“difficult risks” because they are resistant to diversification and are highly
correlated).
121
Complete statistical accuracy is, in fact, unlikely given the state of current
flood maps. See supra Part II.C. Such ambiguity would likely further increase the
premium. See Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 72 (2003) (describing survey data revealing that
ambiguity in either probability of a loss or amount of loss results in “recommended
premiums” that are “considerably higher”); Scales, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing
ambiguity premium).
122
For-profit insurers will create insurance pools only if the contingencies are
statistically predictable with respect to the pool as a whole but occur randomly
with respect to any one contributor. The larger the pool of insureds, the more likely
it is that the actuarial predictions will be sound and provide an adequate basis for
calculating the premiums needed to cover the promised payouts and also yield a
profit to the insurance company. See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 842-43
(describing insurance pools).
123
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 65; Scales, supra note 6,
11 & n.30 (while cross-subsidization is possible, insurance companies oppose
cross-subsidies whether between geographically distinct subsidiaries or between
types of insurance (e.g., auto subsidizing casualty)); see Scales, supra note 6, at 11
(even national insurance companies generally operate through separate subsidiary
companies organized along state lines or even smaller geographic regions).
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risk pool. For example, if a commercial insurance company sought to
create a pool for a flood plain subject to a 1 in 500 chance of a flood in any
particular year, the premiums to establish the reserve would have to be high
even during the early years of the contract in case the current year
happened to be the year in which such a flood occurred.124 Not only would
individuals be unlikely to want to buy insurance requiring high up-front
payments, they would also have such a low probability of receiving any
payout during their lifetime that they would have a difficult time perceiving
any benefit from the coverage.125 Self-insurance would be the general
choice.126
Federal, universal coverage does not, of course, change the pattern
of flood loss. It does, however, allow for greater diversification across
geographic regions and access to non-program resources in particularly
turbulent years. Even with a national program, flood losses can overtake
capacity. This is essentially what happened to the NFIP during the 2005
hurricane season.127 The NFIP met its obligations through its access to
other resources — namely, its borrowing authority.128
2. Adverse Selection
In addition to the need to price for correlation, an insurance
company issuing a hypothetical flood loss policy would also have to price
for a significant adverse selection problem. Adverse selection occurs when
too many of the individuals who purchase coverage do so with certain or

124

With thanks to David Cay Johnston for this example. See Scales, supra
note 6, at 11 (explaining that correlation “induces greater variability in losses,
leading to significantly higher premiums” if an insurance company is even willing
to underwrite such a risk).
125
See infra Part III.B, for a fuller discussion of consumer choices regarding
flood preparation; Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 845 (explaining that “having
no claim” is often viewed as “purchasing a product with little value,
notwithstanding that the person received security against loss”).
126
Proposals to subsidize self-insurance have also been made. For example,
Congress has proposed the creation of catastrophe savings devices — similar to
health savings devices. See Christine L. Agnew, Come Hell and High Water: Can
the Tax Code Solve the Post-Katrina Insurance Crisis?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 701, 738-43 (2007), for a critique of such an approach.
127
See supra Part II.C.
128
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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near-certain knowledge that they will be filing an insurance claim.129 For
example, individuals will be more likely to purchase flood insurance if they
have knowledge that the risk of flood loss is already at the doorstep (or
roof, as the case may be).130 Generally, the problem of adverse selection is
one of information asymmetry.131 With respect to health and life insurance,
this information asymmetry is fairly easy to conceptualize: the insurance
company will not be privy to the private aches and pains of the insured and
may under-price premiums as a result.132 In the case of floods, individuals
would have particularized knowledge about the likelihood of flooding at a
residence, and such knowledge would contribute to a classic adverse
selection problem.
Adverse selection is a common reason advanced for the failure of a
private flood insurance market to develop.133 Universal or mandatory
coverage is the classic solution to adverse selection.134 If everyone is in the
insurance pool, it removes the question of whether some are in the pool
because they have inside information about personal risk. The information
on flood risk developed through the NFIP, however, complicates the
adverse selection picture. As discussed in Part II, part of the NFIP’s
mission is to assess flood risk and make those assessments available to the
public. Thus, individuals can go to a FEMA website to look at flood risk
maps.135 Many of these maps are, as discussed in Part II, incomplete,
difficult to decipher, or out of date, but, presumably, some will be
influenced to purchase flood insurance as a result. Further, the lender
129

See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 19, at 822 (“Adverse selection typically
occurs when insurers cannot distinguish between higher and lower risk
policyholders . . . .”); see also Kaplow, supra note 10, at 543.
130
A vivid example of such delayed response occurred during a flood in
Chesterfield, Missouri, in 1993, when business property owners purchased flood
insurance in response to a flood crest moving down the Missouri River. At the
time, only a five-day waiting period was in place. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note
4, at 1493 (describing the event). Currently, a thirty-day waiting period applies. 42
U.S.C. § 4013(c) (2004); 44 C.F.R. § 61.11(c) (2010).
131
See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 543.
132
Id. at 545.
133
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 135 (noting that private
insurers argued that adverse selection required creation of the NFIP).
134
See MOSS, supra note 19, at 50 (explaining that the ability of government to
compel “broad participation” is “[p]erhaps the most widely recognized justification
for public risk management”); Baker, supra note 20, at 380.
135
Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, FLOODSMART.GOV, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE
NFIP, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2011, 4:17
PM).
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mandate applies only to high-risk property. Thus, the proportion of floodprone properties among all the properties covered by the NFIP is likely
high.136 This result is not, however, readily ascribed to a classic adverse
selection problem given that general flood risk information is primarily
controlled and distributed by the government-insurer and is then used to
enforce the lender mandate.137
Private insurers would also have access to information about
general flood risk and would, presumably, act in their own self-interest
with two possible scenarios emerging. The first scenario assumes that
demand is strongest among those with high-risk property and that as a
result the insurance companies would have to charge higher premiums so
as to account for high-risk property. Higher premiums could drive out
lower-risk properties, necessitating premium increases, driving more lowerrisk properties out — i.e., the replication of an adverse selection death
spiral.138 This cycle could prevent formation of a robust, private flood
insurance option.139 A second, arguably more plausible, possibility is that
insurance companies would use their superior ability to assess risk to limit
coverage only to those at lower risk of suffering damage in what has
become known as a reverse information asymmetry problem.140 As a result,
higher-risk property would not be covered at all — a situation that would
be incompatible with a goal of providing a stable flood loss safety net,
136

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 5.
See Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggerman, Catastrophic Risks and
First-party Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 27 (2008) (under adverse selection
information asymmetry “insurers must be unable to identify high-risk buyers”).
138
See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 544; Scales, supra note 6, at 9 (suggesting
that adverse selection “death spirals” occurring in the flood area is a possibility
with “unique plausibility”). Cf. Faure & Bruggerman, supra note 137, at 26-27
(classic adverse selection “is not a serious problem” with respect to catastrophic
losses); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (refuting the long-held notion that adverse
selection within insurance markets will inevitably lead to a collapse).
139
Baker, supra note 20, at 378 (pointing out that this cycle illustrates that
both insurer-side and insured-side adverse selection are at work).
140
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 135 (describing that in
the hurricane context, insurance companies may have the informational advantage
“if insurance companies spend a lot of resources estimating the risk (which they do
today)” and explaining that “[r]esearch . . . reveals that insurers might want to
exploit this reverse information asymmetry, which results in low-risk individuals
being optimally covered, while high-risk individuals are not”); see Baker, supra
note 20, at 378.
137
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though one that could lead to post-flood government intervention, at least
as to dramatic flood events.141
3. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is the term used for the notion that individuals will
engage in cost-increasing behavior if they are able to shift some of the cost
away from themselves.142 Since moral hazard is a potential side-effect of
cost-shifting, moral hazard is a possible consequence of any opportunity for
cost-shifting — whether insurance, post-disaster assistance, or even
casualty loss tax deductions. While universal coverage helps solve the
adverse selection problem, concerns about moral hazard could loom larger
because of the increased opportunities for cost-shifting that would come
with universal coverage.
An important assumption underlying the moral hazard concept is
that an individual has a consistent cost tolerance with respect to a particular
risk. If part of the cost has been shifted to another party, the benefitted
individual will rationally engage in less careful behavior up until the point
that the expected, unshifted costs reach that individual’s tolerance
threshold.143 For example, a person with auto insurance would drive
incrementally more recklessly than someone without insurance and, in
theory, would set the level of additional recklessness so that any resulting
damage would be adequately compensated by the policy and would not
result in unanticipated, irreparable damage to person or property.144
Insurers use various mechanisms to limit moral hazard, but the two
most common monetary methods are co-pays and deductibles.145 These
141

See infra Part III.B.
KENNETH BLACK, JR., & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE & HEALTH
INSURANCE 11 (13th ed. 2000).
143
See Baker, supra note 21, at 270.
144
See id. at 276-78 (explaining that an assumption underlying the economics
of moral hazard is that “money compensates for loss” when in fact “money cannot
restore the sense of security lost when a storm destroys a home . . . or, indeed,
much of what is important in life”).
145
See Boardman, supra note 19, at 841 (noting that “moral hazard is always
tempered by the extent to which the policyholder remains on the risk, through
deductibles, caps, and the uncertainty of a compliant insurer”); Johnson et al.,
supra note 11, at 232 (“The most common mechanism for controlling moral hazard
is a deductible . . . .”); KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 99
(discussing NFIP deductibles and stating that “the majority of homeowners prefer a
lower deductible”). The NFIP does use deductibles, but since the rates are not
142
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devices are intended to shift just enough pain back to the individuals so that
they are more reluctant to engage in the cost-increasing behavior. Even
though co-pays and deductibles are usually quite small relative to the costs
that are covered by the insurance policy, out-of-pocket costs are fixed,
certain losses that individuals may be particularly prone to shun.146 Indeed,
setting co-pays too high may increase rather than decrease moral hazard by
over-deterring individuals from seeking benefits. For example, if an
individual puts off medical care to avoid a co-payment, the cost of the later
treatment may be much higher.147
In addition to using the pain of out-of-pocket costs to control for
moral hazard loss, insurers may also monitor the behavior of insured
individuals and thereby require a particular level of care.148 Direct
observation of the day-to-day behavior of individuals can be costly, but for
many types of coverage, insurance companies have devised methods for
indirect monitoring, including reliance on monitoring devices (e.g., fire
alarms) or third parties (e.g., doctors).149 The NFIP requires community
adherence to floodplain regulations to increase care and lower the costs of
flood loss.150 Premium rebates or adjustments could be used as monetary
rewards for easily measured good behavior — e.g., an absence of claims on
the policy.151
In the case of flood loss compensation for individuals, the primary
moral hazard concerns arise with respect to how individuals store their
personal possessions, how individuals construct and maintain their homes,
actuarially sound, these deductibles may not have the desired effect. The NFIP also
limits payouts to the value of the damaged property instead of allowing for
payment tied to replacement cost, unless the damage is to a primary residence and
its contents. See also supra Part II.C.
146
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 33-34 (2008) (discussing
loss aversion). See also infra Part III.B (discussing how consumer cognitive
perceptions affect flood loss coverage).
147
ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL
RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY (2011).
148
Baker, supra note 21, at 280-81.
149
Id.
150
See supra Part II.A.
151
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238; Baker, supra note 21, at
270 (discussing that for some types of moral hazard, observational monitoring is
more critical — for example, if the insurance reduces “the incentive to minimize
the cost of recovering from a loss,” e.g., the “malingering aspect of the disability
insurance temptation problem”).
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and where individuals choose to live. Coverage expansion would trigger
concerns about exponentially increased moral hazard costs, particularly
environmental costs associated with increased development. Expansion of
social safety net coverage for individual homeowners and renters could,
however, have less of an effect on moral hazard costs than may appear
upon first consideration because the assumptions underlying moral hazard
analysis are less likely to hold true as to social safety net coverage for
primary residences. 152
In his work excavating the historical and theoretical landscape of
moral hazard, Professor Tom Baker outlined several assumptions behind
classic moral hazard analysis.153 The realities of flood loss suggest that
several of these assumptions do not hold true, particularly as to an
individual’s primary residence. Moral hazard analysis assumes that “money
compensates for loss.”154 While loss of a vacation home may come close to
being compensable by money, the loss of a primary home and its contents
is far less likely to satisfy this condition.155
Another assumption underlying moral hazard is that “people with
insurance have control over themselves and their property.”156 Of course,
individuals have some choice over where to live, but, for many individuals,
such choices will be constrained by many factors, including financial and
social. Further, in the case of flood loss, any particular individual is likely
to be far removed from decisions involving flood plain regulation and

152

See Baker, supra note 21, at 240 (“By ‘proving’ that helping people has
harmful consequences, the economics of moral hazard justify the abandonment of
legal rules and social policies that try to help the less fortunate.”); Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 70, at 108 (“If consumers generally ignore both loss probabilities
and potential government assistance in deciding whether or not to buy insurance
and how much insurance to purchase, . . . [p]ublic intervention based on our
concern for fellow citizens can be straightforward: provide as much assistance as
our conscience dictates to fill in the observed gaps in coverage . . . If such choices
represent outcomes that are incomplete or inefficient according to the ‘selfish’
expected utility model, it is irrelevant because people are not using this model of
choice anyway.”). But see Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 10, at 104 (describing
the “perverse incentive effects” of post-disaster relief as “severely exacerbating
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in locational decisions”).
153
Baker, supra note 21, at 276.
154
Id.
155
See id. at 276-78 (“[Money cannot restore the sense of security lost when a
storm destroys a home . . . or, indeed, much of what is important in life.”).
156
Id. at 276.
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development.157 Expansion of flood insurance to all primary residences
would potentially affect the care taken by residential developers and
landlords,158 but such effects could be handled directly rather than being
used as a reason for denying social benefits to more vulnerable
individuals.159
Moral hazard analysis depends also on individuals being “rational
loss minimizers.”160 As will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section, there is reason to believe that a great many individuals fail to act
rationally with respect to flood loss. If individuals have difficulty
understanding and planning for flood risk, they may also have trouble
engaging in the calculated, care reducing behavior assumed by moral
hazard analysis. Of course, some individuals will strategically engage in
less careful behavior. For example, under the NFIP, the extent of repetitive
loss, particularly for second homes,161 as well as the concentration of
coverage in high-risk areas could suggest a moral hazard problem.162 But
the concentration of policies in high-risk areas could also be attributable in
part to the lender mandate163 or to adverse selection.164
The moral hazard effects of flood insurance expansion also depend
on the extent to which post-disaster relief already stands in for universal
coverage.165 Post-disaster relief operates to shift risk and thus raises moral
157

See id. at 279 (“If the people exposed to the insurance incentive are not in
control of the behavior that matters, then reducing the insurance incentive will
impose a cost on those people while providing little benefit . . . .”).
158
The problem of business flood loss coverage will be addressed in a
subsequent article.
159
See Baker, supra note 21, at 240 (“[C]onventional economic accounts of
moral hazard exaggerate the incentive effects of real-world insurance and, at the
same time, underestimate the social benefits of insurance.”).
160
Id. at 276.
161
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 85 (The CBO
“found that many subsidized properties in coastal areas (23 percent from their
sample of 10,000 properties) were second homes, vacation homes, or rentals.”).
162
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 93-94 (A study
undertaken by Professors Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan of the Florida market
revealed that five counties in Florida accounted for two-thirds of the flood policies
in Florida; these counties were coastal counties whereas the five counties with the
lowest number of policies were located well inland.).
163
See supra Part II.B.
164
See supra Part III.A.2.
165
See Pasterick, supra note 31, at 152 (“The prevailing public impression is
that federal disaster assistance is generally equivalent to the financial protection
provided by hazard insurance. In reality this is not the case.”).
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hazard concerns similar to those of ex ante coverage.166 Post-disaster relief
for large flood events is virtually guaranteed,167 and even for smaller scale
events, various tax provisions operate to shift some of the risk.168 As with
flood insurance coverage, the moral hazard story for post-disaster
assistance also depends, however, on assumptions that may not hold true
for flood loss. For example, the patchwork nature169 of available postdisaster relief may make being a “rational loss minimizer” even more
difficult.170
Given the history of flood loss in the United States, there seems
little doubt that more care should be taken in land use and development.171
At the same time, however, it is less clear the extent to which classic moral
hazard analysis satisfactorily explains the problem, particularly if the focus
is on individual homeowners and renters. Even if flood loss protection does
not fit neatly into a classic moral hazard frame, the problem of unwise,
environmentally harmful development remains. The inability of individuals
to plan carefully for flood loss suggests that steps for greater care,
including not only mitigation but prohibitions, must be express and be
backed by strong incentives or even mandates. Expansion of social safety
net coverage could provide an opportunity to craft such incentives and to

166

See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 281 (“[E]xpectation of federal
relief has almost certainly increased the willingness of some individuals and
businesses to locate or remain in disaster prone areas.”).
167
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (“[T]he driving
force in the provision of government assistance, is the occurrence of large-scale
losses.”).
168
See infra Part V.
169
See infra Part III.B (discussion of problems associated with post-disaster
relief).
170
Baker, supra note 21, at 276; see also KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN,
supra note 6, at 122 (Empirical work on post-disaster relief suggests that
“individuals or communities have not based their protective decisions in advance
of a disaster by focusing on the expectation of government assistance.” Professors
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan cite studies suggesting that “most homeowners in
earthquake- and hurricane-prone areas did not expect to receive aid from the
federal government following a disaster” and that “local governments that received
disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses from future disasters than
those who did not.” Professors Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan conclude “this
behavior seems counterintuitive, and the reasons for it are not fully understood.”).
171
See generally Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4; KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra
note 7.
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enlist homeowners and renters in reducing harm caused by developers and
other real property businesses, such as landlords.172
B. DEMAND AND ITS DISCONTENTS
The central demand puzzle is why so many homeowners and
renters fail to purchase or under-purchase flood insurance, even though it is
a bargain. Examples of this puzzle can be gleaned from news accounts of
recent flooding. In June 2011, the Souris River rose and caused massive
flooding in Minot, North Dakota.173 The river had previously seemed
nonthreatening after numerous public works initiatives had reduced flood
risk.174 In 2000, the federal government had moved the flood risk
assessment level outside the high risk category, which meant that lenders
no longer had to enforce the mandate to purchase flood insurance.175
Although residents remained eligible to participate in flood insurance and
were counseled by federal officials to maintain their policies, a large
number dropped coverage.176 At the time of the flooding, an estimated one
in ten had flood insurance.177 In 2011, only 476 residents had flood
insurance policies; just one year earlier, 959 residents had flood
insurance.178 The combination of public works projects, lowered risk
assessment, removal of the mandate, and financial pressures inexorably led
individuals to stop worrying about floods.179 As one resident put it, “I
didn’t have any concerns. . . . It was not going to happen to me. I was in
complete denial.”180
172

See MOSS, supra note 19, at 50-51 (“[G]overnment enjoys a considerable
advantage over private insurers when it comes to monitoring and controlling moral
hazard directly.”).
173
A.G. Sulzberger, They Dropped Their Flood Insurance, Then the ‘Mouse’
Roared, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, at A13.
174
Id. (“[T]he once flood-prone river—known locally as the Mouse, after its
French name—had seemingly been tamed by public works projects that reshaped
the channel, raised the banks and controlled the flow of water . . . .”).
175
Id.; see supra Part II.B (discussing lender mandate).
176
See Sulzberger, supra note 171.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. (“[A]nother problem facing residents of Minot is a consequence not of
failing to control the river but of decades of doing so successfully. . . . ‘Some
citizens have been lulled into a false sense of security because we have had such
good results,’ said . . . the City Council president.”).
180
Id. (statement by a real estate agent married to a firefighter).
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This response to the possibility of flood loss is not unusual. Even
though the NFIP provides flood insurance at low rates,181 many individuals
still do not purchase it.182 The study of financial preparedness, including the
problem of underinsurance,183 has increasingly become intertwined with
cognitive considerations such as optimism bias, loss aversion, and timeinconsistent preferences.184 This section briefly reviews some of the
potential contributions of this research to the under-purchase of flood
insurance.

181

See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (“A rational, risk-neutral consumer
would purchase coverage at an actuarially fair price that is equivalent to the
expected loss. . . . In practice, the story is apparently not that simple.”).
182
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225 (noting that “coverage is
underpurchased by consumers, even when it is heavily subsidized”); Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 70, at 103 (“The NFIP . . . provides highly subsidized rates for
existing homes so that any risk-averse individual who made the appropriate
calculations of the expected benefits and costs of purchasing such insurance should
have wanted coverage. In the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina the
percentage of homeowners with flood insurance ranged from 57.7 percent . . . to
7.3 percent. . . .”).
183
Underinsurance is a problem for virtually all potentially financially
devastating events — for example, death, disability, and casualty. See
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that thirty-eight
percent of “owner-occupied homes with severe wind damage” in the 2005
hurricanes did not have insurance against wind loss); Levmore & Logue, supra
note 4, at 273-74 (discussing problem of underinsurance for life insurance after the
attacks of 9/11); Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 953, 972-73 (2005) (describing fire
underinsurance in California).
184
See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 101-56 (discussing
cognitive glitches and financial decisions); Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at
282-83 (stating that “simple underinsurance” may result from “myopia,
overoptimism, bad planning, or passivity.”); Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral
Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 336-40 (2011)
(discussing the rational investor versus the real investor); Edward J. McCaffery &
Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 3,13 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006)
(discussing application of “time-inconsistency models” to savings decisions);
Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 154-68 (Ronald J. Daniels et al., eds.,
2006) (discussing inference bias, forecast bias, procrastination, status quo bias, and
empathy gaps); Scales, supra note 6, at 9-10 (explaining individuals’ tendencies to
respond differently to risks that they view as remote).
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Individuals appear to have difficulty conceptualizing
probabilities.185 For low probability events that carry large costs,
individuals often fail to take minimal, economically rational steps —
purchasing flood insurance, for example. On the other hand, many
individuals over-pay for insurance for events that have more salience —
e.g., warranties for small electronics186 or flight insurance following acts of
or warnings about terrorism.187 Using familiarity as a shortcut for
understanding a given probability may work relatively well in a variety of
situations188 but is problematic for flood events.189 Even individuals
residing in a relatively hazardous area may never have personally
experienced a flood event.190
185

KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 121 (discussing studies
suggesting that people cannot “distinguish between probabilities that ranged from
1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million” and that individuals also “did not respond to
insurance premiums as a signal of risk”); Jerry & Roberts, supra note 10, at 845
(discussing lack of demand for coverage of difficult risks as relating to whether the
individual has “past experience with it or know someone else who has endured it”);
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 225-26 (explaining that “consumers may have
distorted perceptions of the size or probability of the risks they face.”). See also
supra Part III.A.3 (discussing assumption of accurate risk assessment underlying
moral hazard analysis).
186
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 78-80 (discussing extended
warranties on small devices and concluding “the extended warranty is a product
that simply should not exist” given various market assumptions).
187
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 226-31 (discussing “distorted beliefs
concerning the probability and size of some potential losses” following from vivid
and dramatic news events, including terrorism). See also KUNREUTHER & MICHELKERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing study finding that “local governments
that received disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses from future
disasters than those who did not”).
188
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 24-26 (discussing cluster of related
mental shortcuts tied to familiarity, including the availability heuristic,
accessibility and salience).
189
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106-07 (discussing how
“[r]ather than using the expected utility model, many residents in hazard prone
areas appear to follow a sequential model of choice” and “[f]or these individuals
only after the occurrence of a disaster does this event assume sufficient salience”).
For example, the purchase of NFIP policies increased dramatically following the
2005 hurricane season. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 87
(750,000 more policies at end of 2007 than in 2005).
190
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 105 (characterizing a “hazardprone area” as one where annual probability of damage “is within the range of 1 in
50 to 1 in 500. So, while the financial losses should such an event occur can be
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Individuals may also be overly optimistic when faced with
probabilistic information.191 Thus, even assuming individuals spend the
time needed to understand flood risk,192 such information may still not be
enough to overcome an optimistic feeling that the event will not actually
happen. As discussed in Part II and also alluded to in the anecdote
beginning this section, public works projects may further contribute to a
false sense of security.193 Individuals who initially purchase a policy may
later cancel because of difficulty in perceiving the benefits of a policy that
has not produced a cash transfer to the insured.194 Flood insurance coverage
may seem superfluous to an individual who has paid for the coverage for
many years but who has yet to file a claim.195 Individuals already feeling
budget constraints will be more prone to seeing the coverage as a luxury
rather than necessity.196 Structuring insurance covering low probability
significant, the great majority of people will not have observed an event close at
hand recently.”).
191
See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 32-33 (discussing
“[u]nrealistic optimism” with respect to statistical risks “to life and health”); Lin,
supra note 184, at 340 (“Despite facts to the contrary, individuals generally have
an overabundance of confidence in their own abilities and an overabundance of
optimism in their futures.”).
192
As discussed supra even expert agencies have difficulty creating and
maintaining accurate flood risk maps. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at
105 (“[M]any potential victims of disaster perceive the costs of getting information
about the hazard and costs of protection to be so high relative to the expected
benefits that they do not even consider purchasing insurance.”) (citation omitted).
193
See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the unintended consequences
public works projects may have). See also Sulzberger, supra note 173 (“Some
residents said they had misinterpreted these revised flood estimates to mean that
they were no longer at risk. Others said they had just used the lower odds as an
opportunity to save some money.”).
194
See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 231-35 (discussing framing effects and
the relative attractiveness of rebates over deductibles). See also THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 36-37 (discussing framing effects and “choice
architects”).
195
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 124 (“People often
purchase flood insurance only after suffering damage in a flood, but many cancel
their policies when several consecutive years pass with no flood.”); Kunreuther &
Pauly, supra note 70, at 107 (stating that there is “empirical evidence that many
homeowners who initially purchase insurance are likely to cancel policies if they
have not made a claim over the course of the next few years”); Scales, supra note
6, at 31 n.108 (“[U]nrealized insurance risks still have substantial value.”).
196
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 105-06 (“[R]eluctance to invest in
protection voluntarily is compounded by budget constraints. For some
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events so that it pays an annual rebate to individuals who have not filed a
claim may help increase policy retention.197
Even if individuals understand that buying insurance would be
economically wise,198 they may decide to wait until tomorrow to make the
purchase given the pain of parting with money today.199 Unfortunately,
individuals tend to keep moving that “tomorrow” forward in time until it
becomes too late.200 Possible contributors to the procrastination
phenomenon include an aversion to parting with cash in exchange for
uncertain benefits201 and a bias toward maintaining one’s current
position.202
homeowners with relatively low incomes, disaster insurance is considered a
discretionary expense. . . . In contrast to the expected utility model where the
demand for insurance depends on the premium relative to the expected loss,
demand appears to depend only on the premium for a given amount of coverage.”).
197
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 233-35 (describing experiment suggesting
that disability insurance structured to provide rebates would be more attractive than
standard disability insurance). See also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 145, at 6265 (describing how making transfers of small amounts of food supplies increased
participation in vaccination program — a program that required multiple
treatments and would yield protection benefits that would occur in the future and
be difficult to perceive).
198
The difficulty individuals have in understanding probabilities and coverage
benefits will reinforce the desire to procrastinate. See BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra
note 147, at 154 (“[T]he [procrastination] problem is made even harder when the
insurance is against a catastrophic event: The payout would take place . . . in a
particularly unpleasant future that no one really wants to think about.”); Meyer,
supra note 184, at 164 (“Decisions to invest in protection against low-probability
events are particularly susceptible to procrastination . . . .”).
199
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (explaining that
“some homeowners with relatively low incomes” will perceive disaster insurance
as a “discretionary expense that should be incurred only if residual funds are
available after taking care of what individuals or families consider to be the
necessities of life”).
200
BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 147, at 65 (“Our natural inclination is to
postpone small costs, so that they are borne not by our today self but by our
tomorrow self instead.”); see also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save
More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112
J. POL. ECON. S164, S167-68 (2004) (discussing the concepts of self-control and
procrastination).
201
See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 33-34 (describing loss
aversion); Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 200, at S169-70 (describing loss aversion
on savings behavior).
202
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 34-35 (discussing status quo bias).
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Pre-commitment devices may solve some types of procrastination
problems.203 The tax system already yields examples of such devices.
Congress codified204 an administrative position205 through which employers
may enroll employees in section 401(k) deferred compensation plan by
default; employees who do not want to participate must then complete an
opt-out procedure. Although employees may fairly easily free themselves
from their bindings, inertia will likely keep most from doing so and will
thereby reduce future regrets over poor planning.206 In addition to this
example of a congressionally crafted technique, numerous individuals save
through the tax system by selecting or sticking with tax withholding rates

203

See McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 184, at 13 (describing advantages of
“self-commitment devices that limit future choices, like Ulysses did when he
bound himself to the mast as his ship passed the Sirens’ sweet song.”). The extent
to which government should act paternalistically to remedy cognitive flaws is
strongly debated. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 4-11; see
generally Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC
FINANCE 355 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006); Jonathan Klick
& Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive
Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
204
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 902, 120 Stat. 780,
1033. See also Automatic Contribution Arrangements, 74 Fed. Reg. 8200, 8200-02
(Feb. 24, 2009); Notice 2009-65, 2009-39 I.R.B. 413 (Sept. 28, 2009) (sample plan
amendments for adding § 401(k)(13) automatic enrollment features); see generally
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH 329 (Jan. 17, 2007).
205
Rev. Rul. 2000-8, 2000-1 C.B. 617, amplifying & superseding Rev. Rul.
98-30, 1998-1 C.B. 1273.
206
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 107-09; James J. Choi et al.,
Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC
FINANCE 304, 339 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006) (discussing
evidence that employees make savings decisions passively and arguing that
“employers should choose their plan defaults carefully, since these defaults will
strongly influence the retirement preparation of their employees”). See also STAFF
OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 51-52 (June 26, 2008). (“The theory is
that to the extent that these employees are not saving for retirement due to inertia
(simple failure to take initiative), that same failure to take initiative may prevent
them from electing out of the contributions” and will thereby assist “employees
who can and want to save for retirement.”).
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that yield significant, lump sum refunds.207 Even though saving through
withholding seems to make little economic sense because of the foregone
interest, the technique helps individuals resist the temptation to spend the
money elsewhere while providing an easy, virtually painless path to
amassing a usefully large sum.208
In the case of disaster insurance, devices for dealing with lack of
preparation may need to be stronger given the difficulties associated with
processing flood loss probabilities.209 The costs of failure to take mitigation
steps may make a disaster more costly,210 yet the more costly the more
likely it is that aftermath aid will be provided. As discussed in the previous
section, adverse selection also presents a problem against which mandates
provide significant protection. The adverse selection problem could be

207

Fennell, supra note 26, at 148 (“About three-fourths of U.S. taxpayers have
more income tax than necessary withheld . . . or make excess estimated payments. .
. .”) (internal citation omitted).
208
STUART RUTHERFORD, THE POOR AND THEIR MONEY 1-7 (2009)
(discussing need and ways poor amass “usefully large lump sums”). See also
Fennell, supra note 26, at 148-52 (exploring explanations for over-withholding
preference, including its use as a pre-commitment device). The allure of lump
sums may inspire other techniques designed to combat under-saving. Recently, for
example, some U.S. credit unions are attempting to correct savings myopia by
adding a lottery hook. See Melissa Schettini Kearney et al., Making Savers
Winners: An Overview of Prize-linked Savings Products 14-20 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16433) (2010), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w16433 (discussing U.S. market potential and current
offerings); Anne Stuhldreher, Credit Unions Launch a Savings Lottery, and
Everyone Hits the Jackpot, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2010, at B4 (discussing savings
lotteries). Such lottery-linked accounts have been utilized internationally for years.
See Mauro F. Guillén & Adrian E. Tschoegl, Banking on Gambling: Banks and
Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts, 21 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 219, 225-29 (overview
of history, practice, and methods used in various countries); See generally Kearney
et al., supra note 208, at 7-14 (discussing use of programs used internationally).
209
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 103 (discussing evidence suggesting
that people’s beliefs about flood loss cause them to “have no incentive to invest in
protective measures voluntarily”).
210
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 262-63 (discussing
“natural disaster syndrome” as increased vulnerability caused by “cost-effective
loss-reduction measures” and reviewing “extensive evidence that residents in
hazard-prone areas do not undertake loss prevention measures voluntarily”).
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exacerbated by cognitive hurdles if flood loss is salient only for those most
at risk.211
Local, state, and federal officials attempting to plan for overoptimism and probability processing difficulty will themselves be subject
to the same types of cognitive challenges.212 Prior to a flood, government
actors may fail to take protective steps even though cost-benefit analysis
strongly supports action.213 Political pressures to limit spending and keep
taxes low may further dampen efforts to take precautionary measures.214
Yet, in the aftermath of a flood, especially a large-scale event, officials will

211

It is also possible, however, that the problem might be lessened if even
individuals facing the highest risk fail to take action because of various cognitive
hurdles. Further, if individuals only perceive flood loss as salient after an event
occurs, adverse selection may be lower because another event in the near future
may be less likely depending on community response. See KUNREUTHER &
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing study finding “that local
governments that received disaster relief undertook more efforts to reduce losses
from future disasters than those who did not”).
212
See Meyer, supra note 184, at 173 (“[B]enevolent central planning” is
limited in “that it has legitimacy only to the degree that benevolent central
planning is free of the decision biases that it is meant to cure.”); Scales, supra note
6, at 12 (“Governments, like individuals, are subject to many of the cognitive
biases that constrain the development of private catastrophe insurance.”).
213
Burby, supra note 38, at 179 (providing three examples of how local
government (in)action in New Orleans revealed a lack of concern about flooding
hazards, including lobbying by the local government for levees built to resist a
one-hundred-year flood rather than a two-hundred-year flood in order to reduce the
local cost share); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 102 (“Public sector
agencies may also behave in ways that are inconsistent with optimal social policy
by not using the principles of benefit-cost analysis . . . as illustrated by the Corps
of Engineers decision not to strengthen the New Orleans levees.”); Meyer, supra
note 184, at 157 (discussing history of hurricanes in the greater New Orleans area
and noting that “ironically, this success [with Hurricane Camille]—combined with
the lack of storms in the years that followed—seemed to deflate rather than spur
interest in completing the [flood-control] project.”); Nunn, supra note 119, at 18690 (detailing information available to public officials regarding the vulnerability of
New Orleans).
214
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing how
“given short-term reelection considerations, the representative is likely to vote for
measures that allocate taxpayers’ money elsewhere that yield more political
capital. . . . because they believe that their constituents are not worried about these
events occurring”).
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be required to do something215 and may reap political rewards for their
public acts of generosity.216 Reliance on ex post relief may carry with it
significant problems. Relief efforts will depend on the vividness of the
event—and, with respect to government assistance, may also depend on the
proximity of the event to an election.217 If the event is sufficiently large
scale, aid may be relatively plentiful.218 On the other hand, even if a flood
event is catastrophic in the life of a particular family, if the flood is an
isolated occurrence, that family may have little access to outside sources of
support.219 Even in cases of large-scale disasters where aftermath aid is
relatively plentiful, access to the aid may be difficult for individuals to
obtain because the path may not be clear having been put together in a
patchy, ad hoc fashion in a stressful context.220 Lower-income individuals
may suffer in particular. For example, an important post-disaster program
is the availability of low-interest loans from the Small Business
Administration for damaged property, including personal residences and
215

Id. at 262 (“The magnitude of the destruction following a catastrophe often
leads public sector agencies to provide disaster relief to victims even if the
government claimed it had no intention of doing so prior to the event.”). See also,
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 86-87 (1990) (discussing congressional “bias in favor of action over
inaction”).
216
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 263 (“The fact that
politicians can benefit from their generous actions following a disaster raises basic
questions as to the capacity of elected representatives at the local, state, and federal
levels to induce people to adopt protection measures before the next disaster.”).
217
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 123 (describing
research showing that “disaster assistance is more prevalent in presidential election
years, all other things being equal”); Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106
(“[T]he amount and terms of the disaster [relief] depend on random political
influences including the proximity of the disaster to the date of the next national
election.”).
218
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 (“What is well understood is
that large-scale losses from disasters are a driving force with respect to the actual
provision of government relief (citation omitted) . . . .”).
219
See Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation:
A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 61-62 (2006) (discussing
horizontal inequity in comparing relief for large-scale disasters and that for
disasters affecting fewer individuals).
220
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 106 (“[T]he combination of low
private insurance and haphazard public disaster relief may lead to inefficiency as
well as high levels of government spending.”).
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effects.221 Low-income individuals are often ineligible for these loans
because of the default risk.222
Costs may be higher with post-disaster assistance—in part because
the cost of administering and obtaining the aid may be more costly because
of lack of pre-planning and in part because the costs may be higher than if
adequate pre-disaster mitigation steps had occurred.223 In the aftermath of a
disaster, the government may overreact by enacting rules that are
inconsistent with other policy goals — tax changes, for example, that have
far larger effects than may have been intended.224 Of course, ex ante
provisions are unlikely to bring the need for aftermath aid down to zero.
Unanticipated problems may emerge and some coverage gaps may remain.

221

KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 19 (describing
program).
222
Id. at 19. See also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 145, at 151-52
(discussing government intervention in international context and noting “[t]he
government intervenes only in cases of large-scale disasters, not when a buffalo
dies or someone is hit by a car. And even disaster relief is, in most cases, vastly
insufficient by the time it gets to the poor.”).
223
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 262 (noting that the
“combination of underinvestment in protection prior to the event leading to large
disaster losses, together with the general taxpayer financing some of the recovery,
can be critiqued on both efficiency and equity grounds”).
224
See Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief:
Rationalizing Tax Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427,
434 (2008) (concluding that “Congress should avoid post-disaster temporary tax
legislation as a means to aid disaster relief efforts”); Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra
note 219, at 53-54 (discussing Congressional overreaction and the “legislative
imperative” to act following a disaster and concluding that the results have “been
disappointing, and largely inconsistent with sound tax policy”).
Professors Ellen Aprill and Richard Schmalbeck, for example, have
recommended having Congress adopt joint resolutions declaring a disaster instead
of delegating to the executive branch the responsibility of designating federally
declared disasters because “Congress will likely always feel that it needs to act
when disaster strikes.” Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 95. They have also
recommended creation of a panel to identify categories of relief provisions—some
of which would be available widely and other that should rarely be used. Id. at 9799. Such “[g]uidelines . . . would establish presumptions, obligating a member of
Congress who proposes to disregard them to offer compelling explanations of why
it would be appropriate to do so.” Id.
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In addition, government officials, charities, and individuals will likely still
want to do something to show altruism and support.225
No simple solution exists to deal with the difficulties inherent in
flood loss and floodplain management. The approach proposed in this
Article is one that relies on having multiple pressure points for action and
needed adjustment with respect to flood loss.
IV. NATIONAL FLOOD LOSS SECURITY PROGRAM
The previous two parts outlined some of the reasons supporting the
case for continued government intervention in flood loss relief and for
structuring such intervention to be widely available and focused on limiting
ad hoc, post-disaster decisions. Much more could (and has) been written on
these issues. This section will, however, take as a working assumption that
the benefits of a broad, ex ante approach outweigh its costs and will turn to
discussing the potential benefits of structuring a national flood loss security
program using the powerful tools available through the tax system. This
Part also outlines one possible structure for such an approach.226 Part V
225

Cf. Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 277 (predicting that “public and
charitable relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be)
less than full private insurance”).
226
The mechanisms proposed in this Article are aimed directly at individuals
instead of being designed to have an effect on institutions potentially involved in
managing flood risk — e.g., insurance companies and charitable organizations
providing aftermath aid. Thus, for example, this Article does not include
discussion of possible subsidies for insurance companies to aid in the creation of a
commercial flood insurance market. See Agnew, supra note 124 (discussing
proposed legislation aimed at providing tax relief to insurance companies for
catastrophe reserves). Nor does it include discussion of some type of
“supercharged subsidy for charitable gifts”. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4,
at 308-09 (discussing such a proposal in the context of terrorism insurance).
The money to fund flood loss coverage could also be raised through a
consumption tax model. State sales taxes are examples of a consumption tax;
excise taxes on alcohol and cigarettes are federal examples of consumption taxes.
See JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 231-68 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing consumption taxes).
The rate of a consumption tax would, however, be much more difficult, if not
impossible, to tie to a particular individual’s flood risk. It would also be more
difficult to adjust consumption tax rates to take into account an individual’s ability
to pay. For example, imagine that a flood tax were imposed as a national sales tax;
to adjust for flood risk and ability to pay, at each point of sale, a questionnaire
regarding one’s income and location of principal residence would need to be
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discusses how current tax law on disaster relief should be adjusted so as to
harmonize with the creation of a broad flood loss security program.
A. LEVERS OF TAX SYSTEM POWER
Flood loss protection is highly complex and requires attention to
both social safety net concerns and concerns regarding unsafe or unwise
development and construction. Utilizing tax system components to
implement flood loss protection could provide multiple avenues for
addressing this complexity. Use of the tax system would facilitate
implementation of mandates and universal coverage, thus ensuring a
minimum level of coverage for all citizens. Universal coverage would also
help to alleviate adverse selection problems and to resolve the difficulty
individuals have in committing to flood loss prevention. Other tax system
components — refunds and rate adjustments, for example — could be
utilized to make the benefits of having coverage more salient and to
incentivize individuals to engage in mitigation efforts. The tax system
could also be structured so as to harmonize with and reinforce other floodcost reduction programs, including relocation programs.
The strength of the withholding mechanism would facilitate the
collection of premiums.227 Other tax return items — gross income, for
example — could be readily utilized to adjust premiums so as to take into
account an individual’s ability-to-pay. As was discussed in Part II,
premium collection is currently outsourced to private insurance businesses
with highly problematic results. The IRS, in contrast, has a strong record of
enforcement competence and general efficiency.228 Further, the IRS and
completed. While the process could be streamlined through technology — e.g., a
smart card — the administrative and compliance problems of using a sales tax for
such a purpose loom large.
A more realistic consumption tax approach would utilize a low-rate
consumption tax to support a supplemental general catastrophe fund for dealing
with unexpected costs. Such a fund could also provide a focal point for political
involvement in the aftermath of the disaster. See Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note
219, at 93.
227
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 226, at 181 (discussing how withholding
technique is a “major enforcement tool”). But see Richard L. Doernberg, The Case
Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1982) (discussing history of
withholding system and providing a critique of the system).
228
John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax
System, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 162 (2003) (“Efficiency pressures are so
embedded in the organizational culture of the IRS that even strong external
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Treasury already have experience dealing with flood events as it must
enforce several tax rules relating to natural disasters.229
Of course, bringing in the IRS and Treasury will also raise new
concerns. Utilizing these governmental units to implement a social program
could further dilute their mission, particularly revenue collection under the
income tax system.230 The IRS and Treasury already play a significant role
in other social programs, such as retirement planning and health care. In
addition, the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous tax expenditures
and other indirect social programs, such as the earned income tax credit.
The detrimental effects of the addition of one more social program to be
administered in part by the IRS and Treasury is hard to know in advance.
Certainly, implementation of the proposed flood loss security program
would require expansion of the IRS budget, something that is politically
difficult even in less partisan times. On the other hand, if the goal is
universal coverage through a federal program, it is difficult to envision a
government agency or private organization better equipped to handle the
collection of premiums.
The IRS and Treasury would not be the only administrative
agencies tasked with overseeing the proposed program. Flood risk
assessment and oversight of community regulations would still belong to
the agency that currently handles those assessments — i.e., FEMA.231 In
addition, FEMA’s role would need to expand to include claims adjustment,
a function which is currently almost entirely outsourced to private
insurance companies through the WYO program.232 The proposed
program’s heavy reliance on administrative agencies raises concerns

pressures have limited ability to change them.”); John T. Scholz & B. Dan Wood,
Efficiency, Equity, and Politics: Democratic Controls Over the Tax Collector, 43
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 1166, 1184-85 (1999) (finding that “efficiency consistently
provides the dominant influence on audit allocation decisions”). Complaints about
the IRS being too driven by collection may, however, arise as they have in the past.
Scholz, supra at 164-65 (discussing efforts by Congress to discourage “unduly
zealous enforcement”).
229
See infra Part V.
230
For general discussion of IRS mission and history, see Alan H. Plumley &
C. Eugene Steuerle, Ultimate Objectives for the IRS: Balancing Revenue and
Service, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 311 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel
Slemrod, eds., 2004).
231
See supra Part II.C (discussing problems with current FEMA maps).
232
See supra Part II.D.
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regarding agency capture and other agency shortcomings.233 As discussed
in Part II, a case can already be made based on the history of the NFIP that
communities exert too much influence over the updating and enforcement
of new flood maps, and FEMA’s approach to Hurricane Katrina can be
cited as a textbook example of regulatory failure.234 While an in-depth
discussion of agency capture and other potential agency flaws is beyond the
scope of this Article, the proposed system arguably should not be any more
problematic than that under the current NFIP and may even be less
susceptible to such pressures.
Moving to a mandatory, universally applicable system may make
interest group formation more difficult.235 Under the NFIP, communities
opt in to the program, and the availability of flood insurance to individuals
depends on communities agreeing to participate in the NFIP. FEMA
appears to have as an internal goal a focus on individual access and
purchase of flood insurance.236 If that is the case, FEMA may be more
inclined to agree to community demands in order to facilitate that mission
since individual access is available only if the community qualifies as an
NFIP participant.237 If flood insurance purchase is mandatory for
individuals, access to coverage would not be held hostage by community
demands. The rates charged to individuals under the system proposed in
this Article would, however, be adjusted through community adherence to
regulations. Thus, pressure from communities on agencies would continue
to be a factor, but the issue of rate rather than access may be less likely to
233

See MUELLER, supra note 40, at 343-47 (discussing phenomenon of rentseeking through regulation).
234
See supra Parts II.A and C. See also Russell S. Sobel & Pater T Leeson,
Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127
PUBLIC CHOICE 55 (2006).
235
See MUELLER, supra note 40, at 475 (“One of the most counterintuitive
predictions of Olson’s theory is that small interest groups are much more effective
at obtaining favors from government than large groups are. . . . In poor countries,
where the agricultural sector is large and the group of middle-class urban dwellers
is small, farmers receive small or even negative subsidies for their products . . .
[but if] farmers make up a tiny fraction of the total workforce, they often receive
giant subsidies.”).
236
See The Official Site of the National Flood Insurance Program,
FLOODSMART.GOV, www.floodsmart.gov.
237
See Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the
Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service,
13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 233, 236 (2003) (discussing the “goal-seeking nature of
bureaucracy”).
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induce capitulation to community pressures. (Of course, communities may
themselves be under greater pressure from their residents as a mandate may
mean that more individuals would take an interest in assuring community
compliance so as to receive the best premium rates possible.)
The involvement of the IRS and Treasury may act as a
counterweight to community pressure and provide monitoring of FEMA.238
Some scholarship suggests that the IRS and Treasury are less susceptible to
capture than other agencies because of the diverse range of interests in the
charge of these agencies.239 In addition, empirical research on IRS
enforcement patterns suggests that the IRS is more influenced by national
trends than by localized politics.240
238

See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 49-58 (2010) (exploring how “shared
responsibilities” among agencies “can either foster or frustrate” agency
independence).
239
Scholz, supra note 228, at 158-59 (“Of all of the specialized enforcement
agencies, the IRS is arguably the most sheltered from direct political influence at
all levels.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci
Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE
L.J. 1165, 1166-67 (1993) (“Tax institutions, because of their greater visibility and
more competitive nature, are less susceptible to interest group capture and possess
greater legitimacy under pluralist criteria than their direct expenditure
equivalents.”).
240
Howard & Nixon, supra note 237, at 233 (“Examining cross-sectional time
series data from 1960 until 1988, we found that the IRS shifts the number of audits
it conducts of businesses versus individuals in response to the prevailing median
ideology of the federal courts of appeals, and in response to the prevailing
ideological framework of the President and Congress.”); Scholz & Wood, supra
note 228, at 1185 (“Partisan responsiveness exerts a somewhat less consistent
influence on audit allocations. State-level partisanship consistently shifts audit
resources away from taxpayers with business income in Republican states, but the
results are less supportive of the partisanship hypothesis for nonbusiness taxpayers.
On the national level, both presidents and Congressional committees influence the
tradeoff between equity and efficiency, with presidential influence being
significant for more categories of taxpayers than committee influence.”); John T.
Scholz & Dan Wood, Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and Public
Administration, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 141, 160 (1998) (“Consistent with past
research on other agencies, the mix of IRS audits also responds to changes in the
presidency as well as changes in the leadership and ideology of members of
congressional oversight committees. On the other hand, the mix of corporate
versus individual audits does not respond to state-level variations in partisanship of
the state’s congressional delegation, governor, presidential vote, or legislature . . . .
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Given the recent series of congressional showdowns over deficits,
social programs, and taxes, enactment of such an expansion over the
current NFIP would face its own hurdles. During the last several years,
Congress has put off dealing with the shortcomings of the NFIP by
enacting short-term extensions of the program.241 Admittedly, the prospects
of a more complete overhaul of the program are relatively dim given the
current political climate. Of particular concern may be the mandatory
aspect of the proposed expansion,242 especially given the litigation
surrounding the mandate contained in the health care legislation.243
Discussion of the constitutionality of the health care mandate is beyond the
scope of this Article, but there is reason to think that the structure proposed
in this Article is less susceptible to such arguments.
The federal government already has a well-established commercial
interest in flood loss protection as evidenced by the NFIP, Army Corps of
Engineers flood mitigation projects, and the provision of aftermath
protection.244 The formation and presence of commercial special interest
groups should also be much lower than was the case with health insurance
given that private insurers have not underwritten flood insurance for
decades, although removal of the WYO payments may cause some
consternation.245 The collection of premiums would be somewhat similar to
that utilized for social security, a program whose constitutionality has been

The picture suggests that earlier reforms have succeeded in insulating field offices
from local influences.”).
241
See supra Part I.
242
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 114 (discussing the prospects of
flood insurance mandate and suggesting “Lower income people will have the
increases cushioned (though not taken away entirely) by subsidies, but the middle
class especially may object to being charged for insurance which they think they
do not need and will never use. How to assemble at least a minimal winning
coalition of citizens to make mandated coverage feasible is a crucial research
topic.”).
243
See Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich.
2010), aff’d 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-5007 (6th Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel Bondi vs.
Health & Human Services, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-724 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. 2011).
244
See 42 U.S.C. § 4001-4002 (2006) (congressional findings regarding
economic burdens caused by flood loss). For discussion of the commerce clause as
it relates to the healthcare legislation, compare Thomas More Law Center 108
A.F.T.R. 2d 2011-5007 at 14-15, with Florida ex rel Bondi, 2011 WL 3519178 at
*24-38.
245
See supra Part II.D (discussion of WYO program).
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upheld.246 The premiums would be paid in substantial part as an exchange
for direct coverage rather than being a penalty related to a decision to selfinsure (which has been characterized by critics of the health care mandate
as a tax on doing nothing rather than an income or excise tax).247 The
vividness of recent flood events and the feelings of altruism triggered by
such events may also ease the path to enactment.248 Finally, it may be
possible to invest a portion of the collected revenues (in years of lower
flooding costs) to spur development of private catastrophe coverage — for
example, stimulation of the catastrophe bond market.249
246

See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (employer
portion). For an overview of the current state of the social security system, see
Patricia Dilley, Through the Doughnut Hole: Reimagining the Social Security
Contribution & Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. LAW REV. 367 (2010).
Although the proposed plan uses the term “premium,” the payments could also
be characterized as a form of income tax under an analysis applied to social
security as well as to the “shared responsibility payment” of the health care
legislation. See Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010) (responsibility payment is a
constitutional income tax); Edward Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, TAX
NOTES 755, 761-62 (Aug. 16, 2010) (the healthcare penalty is a constitutional
income tax and one tied to self-insurance). But see Steven J. Willis & Nakku
Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, TAX NOTES 169 (July 12,
2010) (arguing that penalty is an unconstitutional, unapportioned direct tax —
assuming it is a tax).
Individuals may feel less favorably towards taxes and penalties and more
favorably toward rewards, even if the two structures are economically identical.
Individuals also appear to prefer hidden taxes to obvious taxes. See George
Lowenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable, and Iconic Victims, in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE 32, 38-39 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds. 2006)
(discussing the appeal of hidden taxes). In the case of the health care legislation,
using a term that avoided the word “tax” was viewed as disingenuous and
backfired. Use of the term premium should be less problematic in the case of flood
loss protection given that it is paid in exchange for coverage.
247
See Willis & Chung, supra note 246, at 185 (“Congress could require
everyone to purchase flood insurance from the government and charge
appropriately for it.”). See also Kleinbard, supra note 246, at 759 (explaining that
“[T]he Supreme Court has rejected any invitation to distinguish between taxes
designed to influence behavior and taxes designed to raise revenue.”).
248
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 70, at 108 (“Concern for our fellow
citizens as well as our own needs should disaster strike home makes us want our
government to help out, and in a democracy the public sector responds.”).
249
With thanks to Yariv Brauner & Tom Lin for this suggestion. For
discussion of catastrophe bonds and other alternative risk transfer instruments, see
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While the costs and hurdles to enactment of universal flood loss
will remain largely unknown until such a program is put into place, the
costs to individuals and communities of continuing with the NFIP and the
ad hoc post-disaster relief are relatively well understood. While this Article
advocates a universal system, if such a system were politically impossible a
scaled-back version of the system proposed herein could still be a
significant improvement over the current approach to flood loss.
B. PROGRAM OUTLINE
Payment into the proposed flood loss security program would be
mandatory for individuals,250 and premium collection would be handled as
much as possible through withholding, with adjustments as necessary
through an individual’s annual income tax return. Calculating the
withholding rate could be simplified by making various default
assumptions, which could be then be adjusted through worksheets
completed with the annual income tax return.251 Preferably, the default
withholding rates should be set so that is more likely that individual
adjustments lead to a refund rather than to the requirement of additional

KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 174-90; see also Scales, supra
note 6, at 46.
250
As discussed supra Part IV.B, for individuals at low risk, the tax could be
made an opt-out program if universal coverage were too politically difficult to
enact. Supra note 24. Using an opt-out regime rather than opt-in would allow for
the strategic use of the status quo bias, as has been allowed for 401(k) plans. See
supra Part III.B. Such opting out could come at the price of losing certain other tax
benefits, such as the casualty loss deduction. See infra Part V.C.
251
Complicated details relating to filing status—e.g., married filing jointly—
would have to be worked out, and that level of detail is beyond the scope of this
project. Working out those details may, however, be smoothed by similarities to
other withholding programs. For example, the flood security tax system would
share similarities with the current system for withholding regular income taxes and
the requirement for estimated payments. See Doernberg, supra note 227, at 595
(discussing history of withholding system and providing a critique of the system).
Self-employed individuals are also required to remit self-employment tax with
their tax form each year. See Patricia Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper:
Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65, n.6 (2000). For a
discussion of the conceptual flaws surrounding the self-employment tax, see
Patricia Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper: Reflections on the Self-Employment
Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65 (2000).
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payments.252 The premium rate would depend on the flood risk loss, the
amount of coverage purchased, and ability to pay.
The flood risk assessment would be tied to the location of the
principal residence.253 Second homes would not be covered, which should
help curb repetitive loss problems and is also in keeping with an approach
focused on provision of a safety net.254 Thus, it will be critical to define
principal residence carefully.255 The tax code already uses this term in other
contexts,256 and the same basic approach as contained in those sections
could be utilized. Thus, an individual’s principal residence would depend
on various factors, including place of employment, length of abode, and
residence of family members. Ownership would not be required,257 though
coverage would then, of course, be limited to possessions. Some
individuals may have difficulty pointing to a principal residence — either
252

See supra Part III.B (discussion of individual preferences for tax refunds).
A rate that varies with location raises the question whether the Uniformity
Clause would present an obstacle to enactment of such a program. The Uniformity
Clause is contained in Article I, section 8, which provides “The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” See
Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 78-84 (discussing the uniformity clause);
Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax
Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563, 588-601 (1989). This Article’s
proposals should pass muster under the Ptasynski case. United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74 (1983). In that case, Congress imposed an excise tax on crude oil that
varied according to three tiers and that also exempted “Alaskan oil,” which was
defined in terms of a well’s proximity to the Arctic Circle or Alaska-Aleutian
Range and Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Id. at 77-78. The Court explained in dictum,
“[h]ad Congress described this class of oil in nongeographic terms, there would be
no question as to the Act’s constitutionality.” Id. at 86. See Zelenak, supra at 59194 (explaining significance of this dictum and arguing that Supreme Court is likely
to apply it in future cases). The Court upheld the exemption even though it was
framed in geographic terms because “Congress has exercised its considered
judgment with respect to an enormously complex problem.” Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at
86.
254
As will be discussed in greater detail infra, coverage could also be designed
so as to limit repetitive claims with respect to the same structure. See infra notes
277-79 and accompanying text.
255
A procedure for changing the primary residence would have to be put in
place as well.
256
I.R.C. §§ 121, 123, 1033(h) (2006).
257
The regulations promulgated under Code section 123 have a similar
provision. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(c) (as amended in 1980).
253
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because they have two or more regular residences or because they have no
residence at all. Regulations issued under an unrelated provision provide
that taxpayers with more than one residence are generally treated as having
their primary residence as the place where they spend the most time.258 In
the case of flood coverage, in limited circumstances,259 it may make sense
to allow taxpayers to designate a principal residence.260
Once the principal residence has been identified, the flood risk
associated with the principal residence would have to be determined. This
determination clearly presents an administrative burden, but it is one that is
already present even if the current system takes a less visible approach
through the WYO program261 and the lender mandate.262 Risk rate brackets
would be created, and these brackets could be narrowly or loosely tailored.
One possibility is to mimic the current approach under the NFIP and use
broad designations. For example, three brackets — high risk, moderate
risk, and low risk — could be used as an initial matter. The high-risk
category would apply to homes in one- hundred year flood plains or greater
risk, which corresponds to the current high-risk designation in the NFIP.263
The moderate risk category could apply to homes facing a five- hundred
year flood plain risk or greater (but less than the one- hundred year flood
risk).264 All other homes would be low risk.
As discussed in Part II, flood risk assessments have not been
completed (or are badly in need of updating) for many communities.
Individuals with principal residences in such areas would still need to be
assigned to a risk category. Default assignment to the high-risk category
could maximize the possibility that flood risk assessment would be
completed since the individual would have an incentive to pursue
completion of the assessment. It could also forestall complaints about being

258

Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b) (as amended in 2002).
For example, designation could be freely allowed for high-risk residences
but subject to much greater scrutiny if the designation relates to a home in a lowerrisk area.
260
It would be possible for each spouse in a marriage to have a separate
principal residence if, for example, each spouse has a different home for purposes
of the “away from home” requirement of section 162. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006).
Care would be required to keep such an allowance from becoming a means to
circumvent the principal residence requirement.
261
See supra Part II.D.
262
See supra Part I.B.
263
See supra note 59 (discussion of term).
264
See supra note 62 (describing recommendation for 500-year flood plain).
259
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moved from moderate-risk to high-risk.265 At the same time, individuals
may view an assignment to such a category would undoubtedly be viewed
as punitive by many individuals; thus, it may be politically prudent to set
the default for unmapped areas to moderate risk.
Use of risk rate brackets could function as an incentive for
individuals to lower their risk rate by engaging in less risky behavior (or by
influencing their communities to meet guidelines that would also move the
flood plain risk). In theory, if individuals have a choice of moving to a
high-risk or moderate-risk primary residence, all other things being equal,
they should choose the moderate-risk home to lower the taxes. The
brackets could be used in other ways to minimize costly behavior. For
example, an individual who experiences a flood loss and receives a
payment under the program could automatically be moved into a higher
risk category until the individual shows proof of taking adequate
mitigation266 or relocation to a less risky principal residence.
Rebates could be used to reward individuals who engage in hazard
mitigation or have multiple years without a claim. As discussed in Part III,
individuals appear to prefer to have taxes over-withheld so as to receive the
lump-sum tax rebate payment,267 and individuals may also prefer insurance
rebates (coupled with higher base insurance rates) to deductibles.268
Because flood loss is relatively unlikely even for individuals residing in
high-risk zones,269 interim rewards through refunds may help ease the
psychic difficulty of contributing to a system that in most years may be
perceived as not providing a benefit.270 With a national, mandatory
program, individuals may be more likely to understand the probability of
flood loss because flood losses, if looked at using a national perspective,
may appear more salient.271

265

See supra Part II.C (discussing how FEMA has adopted a grandfathering
approach in response to such complaints).
266
Of course, mitigation devices are themselves not without risk. See supra
Part II.A. See also Klein & Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1486-89 (discussing the
inadequacies of “engineered flood control”).
267
Fennell, supra note 26, at 148-52.
268
Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 232-33, 238.
269
See supra Part III.B.
270
See supra Part III.B.
271
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 352 (“[W]hen one
expands the lens to include a state or country or the global community,
catastrophic risks have a much higher likelihood of occurring.”).
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Community involvement in flood mitigation would remain a part
of the proposal as mitigation does reduce flood losses (within limits).272
Homes in nonparticipating communities could automatically be treated as
being in a high-risk area, while communities that receive high mitigation
ratings could trigger rate reductions for their residents. Thus, the
Community Rating System, described in Part II, would remain an
important feature of the flood loss landscape.
Risk would not be the only item to affecting rate, and adjustments
would also be made for coverage and income. In order for the program to
function as a social safety net, minimum coverage levels as well as
maximum coverage levels would need to be set. The minimum coverage
level should be tied to local cost of living measures. The maximum
coverage limits under the current NFIP appear generally adequate.273
These limits are $100,000 for personal property and $250,000 for
residential real estate.274 The coverage would apply per residence, so a
married couple sharing the same principal residence would have the same
coverage limits as a single individual residing alone in one principal
residence. Above the minimum coverage level, individuals would be
required to demonstrate actual loss rather than receiving the replacement
value amount.275 A side effect of the proposed flood security plan may be a
decrease in the aftermath relief provided by private sources and through
special legislation.276 Thus, minimum coverage should include payments
for temporary living expense grants.
272

See supra Part II.A. See also Burby, supra note 38, at 182 (“The number of
NFIP insurance claims per capita for compensation of flood damages and the per
capita dollar amount of payments made to settle claims were highest in states that
did not require responsible behavior—neither building code enforcement nor
comprehensive plans—from their local governments. . . .”).
273
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 83 (describing study
of years 2000-2005 suggesting that “almost three-quarters were still below the
$250,000 maximum coverage limit. One reason for this large percentage is that
many homes had property values below this limit.”).
274
See supra Part II.C. This coverage will not, of course, provide a full
recovery for many residences. Individuals with residences worth in excess of the
maximum coverage would be left to seek excess coverage in the private market, to
the extent available. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 41 (noting
that in Katrina some homes covered by flood insurance still suffered large
uninsured losses because of the $250,000 NFIP cap and failure to obtain “excess
coverage from private carriers”). Such a result is, however, consistent with the
safety-net focus of the proposed program.
275
See supra note 75.
276
See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4.
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One possibility for further tamping down repetitive loss would be
to have structural coverage run with the property rather than with the
individual277 and limit the recovery per property to a particular number of
times, through a declining coverage regime, or through a combination of
the two. For example, maximum structural coverage could be reduced in
half to $125,000 for a second occurrence, halved again for a third
occurrence, with coverage disappearing entirely for a fourth occurrence.278
Such a system would add some further complication to the collection
system, and notations would also need to be added to deeds so that
purchasers would not be caught unawares. The threat of coverage removal
would also have to be credible.279 Coupling coverage reductions with
relocation grants may be advisable as may be providing some type of reset
mechanism in the event of community changes.
The amount of tax owed would also be adjusted for income level
— with “income” tied to gross income rather than to “wages”.280 Taxexempt interest should be added back in for a more accurate snapshot of an
individual’s ability to pay.281
Because adjusting for income levels would further complicate the
proposed withholding system, it may be advisable to have fairly broad
categories and then create credits for the poorest individuals. For example,
the withholding rate could remain unchanged from $1 to $250,000, from
$250,000 to $999,999, and finally from $1 million and up.282 Lower income

277

With thanks to Marty McMahon for this suggestion. See also Scales, supra
note 6, at 20 n. 70 (noting that “insurance does not ‘run with the land’” in
discussing lender mandate since “mortgage obligations have a life of their own”).
278
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 264-65 (“In areas
that have suffered multiple catastrophes—say, three or more—nature may be
telling us something: that these locations are naturally much more likely to be
damaged than others.”).
279
See Kydland & Prescott, supra note 45, at 477 (“But the rational agent
knows that, if he and others build houses there, the government will take the
necessary flood-control measures.”).
280
The definition of “wage” may be quite complex. I.R.C. § 3401 (2006).
281
A similar rule applies to the taxation of Social Security benefits. I.R.C. §
86(b)(2)(B) (2006). See Goldin v. Baker, 809 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1987)
(upholding constitutionality of § 86(b)(2)(B)).
282
By comparison, the rate brackets in the general income tax system are more
compressed and the highest rate bracket begins at a fairly low level. See Martin J.
McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993
(2004) (discussing distribution of income tax system brackets).

2011

MANAGING THE NEXT DELUGE

55

individuals could then receive credits to further assist them in participating
in the system.
Adjusting the premium for wealth rather than for gross income
would arguably provide a more accurate picture of an individual’s ability to
pay the tax, particularly since the coverage would be for a wealth loss, but
measuring wealth would be far more difficult than measuring income given
that there is no annually assessed U.S. wealth tax.283 Coverage levels may,
in any case, be a rough proxy for wealth. That is, wealthier individuals may
be more likely to seek to cover the maximum amount of property damage,
and the rate can be increased for larger coverage amounts. As will be
discussed in the next Part, coverage limitations should be enforced directly
but also indirectly through, for example, limitations on the casualty loss
deduction.
V. CHANGES TO THE CODE
Various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code provide
additional risk-shifting from individuals to the government (and then out to
other citizens).284 This section outlines the current tax treatment of: noninsurance benefits received from government or private actors; insurance
proceeds for property loss and for temporary assistance; and losses not
reimbursed by insurance, government, or other private actors.285 As to each
283

For a discussion of wealth taxes, see Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal
Taxes Aare Subject to the Rule of Apportionment under the Constitution?, 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 839 (2009); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000).
284
See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 19-20 (explaining
that federal tax policy on catastrophe losses “affect the risk mitigation incentives of
property owners and insurers’ ability to finance catastrophe losses”); MOSS, supra
note 19 (describing various ways governments intervene in regulating risk).
285
The discussion in the Article centers on those Code provisions aimed most
directly at individuals and their personal property losses, but Congress has in the
past enacted and may again enact other special relief rules in the event of a
disaster, including provisions aimed at business losses. See generally, James
Edward Maule, Tax Incentives for Economically Distressed Areas, in BNA TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO no.597 (2007). Congress may enact business-related
provisions—e.g., enhanced expensing or net operating loss treatment. State and
local governments’ ability to issue bonds may be increased and restrictions on
certain credits, such as the low income housing credit, may be lifted. See I.R.C. §§
1400L-1400Q (2006). Further, charities and charitable deductions may receive
favorable treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 1400L-1400Q. Penalties on retirement account
withdrawals may be lifted and deadlines extended for various tax items. See I.R.C.
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group, this section also discusses changes that may be recommended so as
to harmonize these provisions with the proposed flood loss security
program.286 Such harmonization is achieved through favorable tax
treatment for benefits received under the proposed program and supporting
mitigation grant programs while placing some limits the tax benefits to be
obtained for non-program assistance and strongly limiting the deductibility
of uncompensated flood losses.
A. NON-INSURANCE ASSISTANCE
In the immediate aftermath of a flood, government agencies,
charitable organizations, commercial businesses and individuals frequently
provide temporary aid to the victims. This aid is likely to include fresh
water, meals, hygiene supplies, clothing, transportation, and shelter.287
From a traditional, economic approach to defining income, such items are
arguably taxable increases to the recipients. Not surprisingly given the
circumstances in which these transfers occur, the value of temporary aid for
disaster victims is generally excluded from taxable income, though until
about ten years ago, the path for exclusion depended in large part on
Service rulings288 and was sometimes arguably inconsistent with the
Internal Revenue Code.289
§§ 1400L-1400Q. See also Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 219 (providing
overview of relief enacted in response to 2005 hurricane season and attacks of
September 11, 2001); Lipman, supra note 183, at 976-1018 (describing Code
sections aimed at disaster relief).
286
Even in the absence of enactment of the proposed expansion of flood
insurance, these tax sections could be better aligned with the goals of the NFIP and
other flood-related programs. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6,
at 20 (“[C]urrent tax policy with respect to uninsured disaster losses has received
little attention to date, as it creates disincentives for efficient disaster risk
management.”).
287
Disaster relief grants made to businesses are not addressed in this Article.
For background on such grants, see Notice 2003-18, 2003-1 C.B. 699 (grants to
businesses affected by World Trade Center attacks not excludable as gifts or as
general welfare payments).
288
For example, under these older authorities, if temporary assistance came
from government, it would be treated as a nontaxable, general welfare distribution.
Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17,18. Not all
governmental transfers are excluded from gross income. For example,
unemployment is included because it is substitute for wages. I.R.C. § 85 (2006).
See also Rev. Rul. 85-29 (Alaska dividend payments are income); J. MARTIN
BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME (9th ed. 2010), at
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225-26 (discussing general welfare rulings). In some cases, use of the general
welfare exclusion was technically problematic. For example, in the aftermath of a
fire caused by the National Park Service, the Service had difficulty determining
whether relief payments that were also a settlement of any claims against the
federal government could qualify under the general welfare exclusion and whether
a distinction should be drawn between insured and uninsured individuals. See infra
Part V.B.1 (discussing Code section 123 which provides a limited exclusion for
payments under insurance contracts for temporary living expense assistance). The
Chief Counsel’s office recommended not taxing any of the payments even though
it could not fully support this administrative position under then-current law. I.R.S.
CCA 200114044; I.R.S. CCA 200114045. A limited exception was made for
amounts “received for luxuries or for living expenses of an individual who has
abandoned efforts to re-occupy a dwelling comparable to the one whose occupancy
or use was denied by the fire.” I.R.S. CCA 200114045.
Individuals would be able to exclude assistance from a charitable
organization or another individual as gifts, so long as the transfer proceeded out of
charitable impulses and without the imposition of quid pro quo conditions. See
I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006); Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
289
In particular, a revenue ruling permitting employees to exclude disaster
relief from employers was particularly problematic because it took the position that
such transfers were not income because “[t]he objective of the corporation is to try
to place the employees in the same economic position, or as near to it as possible,
which they had before the casualty.” Rev. Rul. 131, 1953-2 C.B. 112, 113 (1953),
made obsolete by I.R.C. § 102(c) & I.R.C. § 139. The ruling did not, however,
allow the employees to increase basis in damaged property. Id. at 113-14. The
revenue ruling was issued prior to the Supreme Court’s determination that income
consisted of “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion.” Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426,
431 (1955). But how casualty events should be treated even given an expansive
definition of income remains a matter of debate. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal
Deductions—A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.D.C.L. 1, 37-40 (2002) (arguing that casualty and theft loss deductions should not
be treated as departures from economic income and should not be treated as tax
expenditures by the Joint Committee on Taxation). See also Boris I. Bittker,
Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L.
& ECON. 193, 198 (1973) (arguing that an insistence that there is only one way to
view casualty losses in terms of an income definition is “sheer dogmatism”).
More problematic for the validity of the ruling was the 1986 enactment of
a rule prohibiting an exclusion from gross income for “any amount transferred by
or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.” I.R.C. § 102(c) (2006);
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2110 § 122(b) (1986). See
also Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (“[T]he payments made by the employer
described in Rev. Rul. 131 do not qualify as gifts under § 102 and are not excluded
from the employees’ gross income under the general welfare exclusion.”).
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In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress amended the
Internal Revenue Code290 to codify partially the Service’s administrative
positions with respect to non-insurance disaster transfers without
supplanting the exclusion for governmental general welfare transfers.291
Currently, the Code provides an exclusion from gross income for a
“qualified disaster relief payment”292 (relief payment) and a “qualified
disaster mitigation payment”293 (mitigation payment). Relief payments are
tied to the immediate aftermath of a disaster while mitigation payments are
grants to be used for improvements that will lessen the extent of future
losses.294 With respect to either type of payment, the Code provides that if
an excludible payment is received, the individual may not use the excluded
funds to take a further deduction or credit.295 In other words, taxpayers may
not obtain two tax benefits for the same dollars.
1. Qualified Disaster Relief Payments
In order to be excluded from income as a qualified disaster relief
payment, the payment must be for “reasonable and necessary personal,
family, living, or funeral expenses” or “reasonable and necessary expenses
Legislation enacted in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, clarifies that payments
made in connection with certain types of disasters are not gross income, regardless
of source of payment (other than insurance payments). I.R.C. § 139. See also
Cords, supra note 224, at 442 (discussing difficulty of excluding payments from
employer to victim-employee “because they did not easily fit within the definition
of a gift”).
290
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134 § 111,
115 Stat. 2427, 2432 (2001).
291
Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (explaining that § 139(b)(4) “codifies
(but does not supplant) the administrative general welfare exclusion”).
292
I.R.C. § 139(b) (2006).
293
I.R.C. § 139(g).
294
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, JCS- 1-07, at 6 Report JCS-1-07
(explaining that mitigation payments are “grant[ed] to mitigate potential damage
from future hazards” whereas relief payments ally to “certain amounts received by
individuals as a result of a disaster that has occurred”); see 42 U.S.C. §
4011(b)(4)(listing mitigation programs and including properties covered by such
programs in the NFIP); 44 C.F.R. Parts 78-80 (flood mitigation assistance &
grants; property acquisition & relocation for open space).
295
I.R.C. § 139(h) (“[N]o deduction or credit shall be allowed . . . for, or by
reason of, any expenditure to the extent of the amount excluded under [section
139] with respect to such expenditure.”).
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incurred for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal residence or repair or
replacement of its contents.”296 FEMA temporary assistance grants would
be excludible under this authority.297 A qualifying relief payment does not,
however, include payments received under an insurance contract or
compensation for costs that have already been covered by an insurance
contract.298 Payments made under a flood insurance contract are, of course,
296

I.R.C. §§ 139(c)(1)-(2) (2006). In addition, non-governmental payment
must be made in connection with a qualified disaster, which includes a disaster
resulting from a “terroristic or military action” or a federally declared disaster.
These items “terroristic or military action” are in turn defined in Code § 692(c)(2)
and includes “any terroristic activity which a preponderance of the evidence
indicates was directed against the United States or any of its allies” and “any
military action involving the Armed Forces of the United States and resulting from
violence or aggression against the United States or any of its allies (or threat
thereof).” I.R.C. § 692(c)(2). Code section 692(c)(2) goes on to specify that
“’military action’ does not include training exercises.” Id. Code section 139 also
has provisions relating to common carrier disasters (e.g., airline crashes). See
I.R.C. §§ 139(b)(3), 139(c)(3).
A federally declared disaster “means any disaster subsequently determined by
the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government
under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.”
I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(C). The definition of “federally declared disaster” is in a Code
section whose primary effect (an increase in the standard deduction) only applies
to disasters occurring before January 1, 2010. Nevertheless, the definition itself
has not expired. In any case, prior to 2008, section 139 was tied instead to a
“Presidentially declared disaster,” which had virtually the same meaning as the
current “federally declared disaster.” Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, 3922 Division C, §
706(a)(2)(D)(iv) (2008). In order for a disaster to be considered presidentially
declared, the disaster, “with respect to the area in which the property is located,
resulted in a subsequent determination by the President that such area warrants
assistance by the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act.” I.R.C. § 1033(h)(3) (2006).
Payments from government sources, whether federal, state, or local, are
excluded if made “in connection with a qualified disaster in order to promote the
general welfare.” IRC 139(b)(4). With respect to governmental payments, qualified
disaster is defined more broadly to include “a disaster which is determined by an
applicable Federal, State, or local authority . . . to warrant assistance from the
Federal, State, or local government or agency or instrumentality thereof.” I.R.C. §
139(c)(4).
297
See Lipman, supra note 183, at 962-71.
298
Other than these restrictions related to insurance coverage, the statute does
not require that non-governmental payments must be from a particular source. For
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ultimately made by the federal government, but the statute does not contain
an exception for flood insurance in its requirement that the provision only
applies to payments “not otherwise compensated by insurance.” Since the
NFIP is generally treated as insurance for other purposes,299 and since the
Service has apparently not issued guidance on this issue,300 payouts under
the NFIP should be handled under the tax provisions relating to insurance
recoveries rather than under the exclusion for governmental disaster relief
payments.
For flood losses that occur outside the context of a federally
declared disaster, individuals would be able to exclude transfers from
individuals, charitable organizations, and government by arguing that these
transfers are gifts (if from individuals or charities) or are general welfare
transfers (if from government).301 Thus, the main difference between
treatment of flood losses occurring in federally declared disasters and other
flood losses is that transfers by employers and employer-operated
foundations would be subject to much greater scrutiny and would most
likely be taxable as a matter of positive law (whether the Service would
example, the Service has confirmed that transfers from employers to employees
may be excluded from income by the employees, so long as the requirements of the
Code are met. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (holding that even though
employer transfers to employees do not qualify as gifts or as excludible general
welfare, they may qualify for the section 139 exclusion if the other conditions are
met). See supra note 158 (discussing the problem of employer temporary
assistance payments).
299
See supra Part II.
300
In 2000, the National Park Service caused a fire that destroyed more than
200 residences in New Mexico. The Service’s Office of Chief Counsel issued
informal letters advising the exclusion of the FEMA payments made both to
provide relief for the disaster and to settle any claims an individual might have
against the federal government for the disaster. I.R.S. CCA 200114044; CCA
200114045. In addition, the Office of Chief Counsel further advised that FEMA
reimbursements for NFIP premiums were excludible to the extent the fire caused
taxpayers to need to purchase flood insurance as a result of the fire. I.R.S. CCA
200114046. The Chief Counsel’s Office provided little analysis to support its
“belie[f] that under the unique circumstances . . . the government’s reimbursements
of flood insurance premiums need not be treated as gain.” I.R.S. CCA 200114046.
In any case, none of the Chief Counsel Advice memoranda dealt with flood
insurance contract payments made to compensate for flood loss, and the letters also
pre-date Section 139’s exclusion for qualified relief payments.
301
See Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283 (discussing treatment of
government, charitable, and employer transfers in context of presidentially
declared disaster).
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pursue such transfers at the individual flood victim level is a different
matter).
The proposed flood loss security program with its mandate may
decrease the extent to which individuals receive aftermath aid from other
sources.302 Post-disaster assistance seems unlikely, however, to dwindle
altogether, and in the case of high-profile events is still likely to be
significant. This Article proposes that the exclusion for post-disaster
assistance should continue given the possibility of unexpected needs and
the administrative difficulty of enforcing an inclusion at a time of crisis.
The exclusion should, however, be made more generous so as to apply with
respect to any flood loss without the need for a federally declared disaster.
The current exclusion is allowed only to the extent amounts are not
already covered by insurance.303 As an enhancement to the social safety net
aspects of the proposed program and for administrative convenience, this
provision could be lifted to the extent of the minimum required coverage
for personal property.304 For example, if the minimum required coverage
for personal possessions were $15,000, individuals could receive a
matching amount from non-insurance sources income-tax free even if there
is some coverage duplication. It would, however, also be advisable to put a
cap on the amount that could be excluded if received from non-government
sources, especially employers. This cap could be set to match the personal
property coverage maximum and would be added to prevent the problem of
disguised compensation but also to avoid the possible creation of a shadow,
government-subsidized system for higher income individuals.305 Of course,
transfers from family and friends that exceed such a maximum amount
would still potentially be excluded from income under the general
provision for gifts.306

302

See Levmore & Logue, supra note 4, at 280 (speculating that if private
insurance covers disaster losses “there is apt to be less sympathy and therefore a
lower probability of public or charitable relief”).
303
See supra Part IV.A.1.
304
This assumes that the proposed program is mandatory at all risk levels. See
supra Part IV.B. If the program is made opt-out for certain categories of risks, the
exclusion for non-insurance assistance should be largely disallowed as to those
who choose to opt-out. This disallowance could help discourage individuals from
opting out. The general gift provision of Code section 102 would still be available.
305
To the extent high-end private flood insurance is (or becomes) available,
payments under the contract would be governed by general provisions applicable
to insurance reimbursements. See infra Part V.B.
306
I.R.C. § 102 (2006).
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2. Qualified Disaster Mitigation Payments.
In addition to aftermath aid, Congress has instituted grant programs
aimed at lessening future flood damage.307 For example, homeowners may
apply for grants to elevate a home.308 In an informal memorandum, the
Service’s Office of the Chief Counsel advised that such payments were
taxable because they were for the mitigation of future disasters and thus
were not the type of relief payments excluded by either the Code or the
administrative general welfare exclusion.309 Congress acted in 2005 to
change this result and provided a retroactive exclusion for these types of
payments.310 In order to qualify for the statutory exclusion, however, the
payments may not be for the sale of the property.311 If the grant is in
substance the purchase of a property, then payments are not excluded and
would instead generate gain or loss according to the difference between the
payment and the individual’s tax investment (i.e., the individual’s adjusted
basis) in her property.312 Taxpayers would be able to defer recognition of
any resulting gain through purchase of qualifying replacement property,313

307

See I.R.S. CCA 200431012, 2004 WL 1701305 (IRC CCA) (describing
mitigation grants authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act and The National Flood Insurance Act); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, JCS- 1-07.
NFIP flood insurance contract payments would not be excluded as
qualified disaster mitigation payments since the contract payments are
reimbursements for losses that have already occurred and are not made to lessen
future losses.
308
See supra note 292 (mitigation programs).
309
I.R.S. CCA 200431012 (advising that the mitigation payments were not
excludable under Code sections 102, 139, or 1033 or through administrative
practice regarding general welfare or government-created property rights).
310
I.R.C. § 139(g)(3) (2006); Public Law 109-7, § 1(a)(1) (2005). Any hazard
mitigation payment used with respect to property may not also increase the basis in
that property. I.R.C. § 139(g)(3); Pub. L. No. 109-7, 119 Stat. 21 § 1(a)(1) (2005).
Any hazard mitigation payment used with respect to property may not also
increase the basis in that property.
311
I.R.C. § 139(g)(2).
312
I.R.C. § 1001.
313
Code section 1033(k) provides that section 1033 is available for these types
of sales even though these programs are voluntary. I.R.C. § 1033(k). See infra Part
IV.B.2 (describing Code section 1033).
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but any loss would apparently be nondeductible if the payment related to a
residence or other personal-use property.314
The exclusion for hazard mitigation payments should remain in
place315 in order to continue to encourage steps that lessen the costs of
flood loss. Expansion of the benefits of such steps should also be explored.
For example, relocation programs that are the equivalent of a sale could
provide for a loss deduction, if any tax loss results.316
314

If the sale relates to a personal residence, the loss would be a nondeductible
personal loss under the Code. Individuals may deduct casualty and theft losses
even if the underlying asset is a personal-use asset, but any loss generated by the
type of sale described in Code section 139(g) would not qualify. The programs
described in Code section 139(g) are voluntary hazard mitigation programs, so
there is no involuntary taking. See CCA 200431012; Joint Committee Report,
JCA-1-07.
Code section 165(k) does allow taxpayers to take a casualty loss deduction if a
taxpayer is ordered by a governmental entity to demolish or relocate a residence
because it has been rendered unsafe as the result of a federally declared disaster
and the order to demolish occurs not later than the 120th day after the federal
disaster declaration. I.R.C. § 165(k) (2006). Section 165(k) would not apply with
respect to the voluntary hazard mitigation programs currently offered under the
Stafford Act and the Flood Insurance Act. In the absence of section 165(k), it is
less clear whether a government action such as an ordered demolition of an unsafe
building would qualify as a casualty event. See, e.g., Powers v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. 1191 (1961) (no casualty loss deduction allowed for impounding of car by
East Berlin authorities); Washington v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1990-386 (losses
arising out of a court-ordered eviction were not casualty losses). Compare I.R.C. §
280B (disallowing deduction for demolition costs). Eminent domain actions by
federal, state, or local government require, of course, payment of just
compensation. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fl. Dept. Environment’l
Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601-02 (2010) (general discussion of Takings Clause
of U.S. Constitution). Because of the compensation element, section 1033 rather
than section 165 would almost certainly be the applicable provision. Section 1033
is discussed infra Part V.B.2.
315
See supra Part IV.A.2.
316
This could be accomplished either by treating the loss as a casualty loss or
as an investment loss. If treated as a casualty loss, some of the current limitations
on deductibility could be relaxed, as has been done in the past for certain types of
casualty losses. See infra Part V.C. Because the sale would be of a personal
residence, any loss would be nondeductible under current law, so legislation would
also be required for such a loss to qualify as an investment loss. If treated as an
investment loss, the loss would be capital and subject to various timing constraints
on deductibility, which could also be relaxed. See I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 1212(b)
(limiting capital loss deduction to amount of capital gains plus $3,000, with excess
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Such tax enhancements should, however, require that the
individual move to a low risk home and also require evidence that the home
had a prior history of flooding. Such tax enhancements should, however,
require that the individual move to a low risk home and also require
evidence that the home had a prior history of flooding. A more generous
tax treatment for sale-equivalent relocation may particularly be needed if
coverage of structural components is structured to decrease and eventually
disappear for repetitive loss to the same structure.317 Hazard mitigation
grants could also be used to support adjustments to the premium charged
individuals. In addition to direct grant programs, tax credit programs could
also be enacted to encourage home improvements that would decrease
flood loss.318
B. INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Current tax law divides casualty insurance payouts into two basic
categories: payments for temporary living expenses and payments for
property damage.
1. Temporary Assistance
A limited tax exclusion applies to insurance payments for
temporary living expenses.319 The Code exempts from tax insurance
carried forward). For individuals without capital gains, casualty loss treatment
would provide the lower tax result because casualty losses yield an offset against
ordinary income.
317
See supra Part IV.B.
318
Similar tax credit programs have been enacted with respect to energy
efficient improvements. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25D (2006). See also KUNREUTHER &
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 6, at 264 (suggesting tax incentives as a way “to
encourage residents to pursue mitigation measures is to provide tax incentives” and
describing success of an earthquake loss mitigation program established by the city
of Berkeley, California).
319
I.R.C. § 123 (2006). In the absence of Code section 123, such temporary
assistance transfers would be taxable. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(5) (insurance
payments for living expenses are includible in gross income except to the extent
provided for in Code section 123). First, payments for temporary assistance made
by an insurance company to an insured would never qualify as a tax-exempt gift
since such temporary assistance would occur by operation of the insurance contract
instead of out of charitable impulses. Second, since individuals have no deduction
for personal consumption, a non-statutory exclusion of the insurance proceeds for
such consumption would be problematic. I.R.C. § 262. At the same time, the
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reimbursements for “living expenses incurred during such period for
himself and members of his household resulting from the loss of use or
occupancy” if the individual’s principal residence is damaged by casualty
or if the individual is not able to enter his principal residence on
government orders because of the threat of a casualty.320 “Principal
residence” in this context “depends upon all the facts and circumstances in
each case,” and includes also rented residences.321 The exclusion applies
only to living expenses and not to payments made for loss of income or for
lost or damaged property.322 A federally declared disaster is not a
requirement, so this exclusion applies to any casualty event causing
displacement from the principal residence. A taxpayer may exclude the
insurance payment only to the extent the actual expenses incurred during
the displacement exceed the normal expenses that would have been
incurred but were avoided as a result of the casualty.323 As a result, the
exclusion applies only to duplicative and increased living expenses.324
dividing line between insurance premiums and pre-payments for services is not
always clear. For example, purchasers of AAA undoubtedly view roadside
assistance as services for which they have already made payments. Cf. Am. Auto.
Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 689 (1961); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm’r,
353 U.S. 180, 180 (1957) (membership dues included in income upon receipt).
Discussion of the line between prepayment for services and insurance is beyond
the scope of this Article.
320
I.R.C. § 123(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a).
321
Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(c). Omitted from this definition of “principal
residence” is a link to Code section 121, which provides an exclusion for gains
realized on the sale of a principal residence. In any case, the principal residence
definition in the section 123 regulations is consistent with, if not as nuanced as,
that contained in the section 121 regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b). See
supra Part IV.B (discussing principal residence concept).
322
Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(3).
323
Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(b)(1). The regulations also require that payments
must be traceable to reimbursement for living expenses under the insurance
contract. Thus, if an insured receives a payment on account of lost rental income
and uses it for duplicative living expenses, the payment will not be excluded under
this provision. The regulations contain ratios for determining the extent to which
an insurance reimbursement is for living expenses if there is blanket coverage
rather than identifiable living expense coverage. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(a)(4).
324
For example, if a family spends $800 per month normally on food cooked
in the residence but is now forced to spend $1,200 on restaurant meals but spends
nothing on cooking food, only a maximum of $400 could be excluded for
increased food costs. All the living expenses are considered in the aggregate, so
this $400 increase might be offset by decreases elsewhere—for example, by a
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This limitation is not lifted even if the triggering event is a
federally declared disaster. In at least one instance, the Service’s Office of
Chief Counsel has, however, advised against implementing the limitation
and instead advised field agents to apply a blanket exclusion for all living
expense reimbursements other than those for “luxuries or for living
expenses of an individual who has abandoned efforts to re-occupy a
[comparable] dwelling.”325 The Chief Counsel Advice memorandum may
not be used as precedent and was given in response to a disaster triggered
by the actions of the National Park Service.326 Still, the memorandum
perhaps provides some indication of the relative zeal with which the
Service will audit those claiming exclusions for insurance coverage of
temporary living expenses — particularly if the displacement occurs in the
context of a large-scale disaster.
Coverage under the NFIP does not currently cover temporary
living expenses,327 but the proposed program would provide such coverage
and the current exclusion would thereby become applicable. The limitation
relating to the need for duplicative costs should be lifted with respect to
flood program payments for the same reasons that non-insurance amounts
should be excluded up to a certain point: to further safety net goals and to
reduce administrative complexity.328 An exception for luxuries, as
suggested in the Chief Counsel Advice described above, should not be
necessary because the amount of coverage for temporary living expenses
would be statutorily capped at an amount tied to meeting basic needs.
2. Property Loss Reimbursement
It may seem counterintuitive that a catastrophe could give rise to a
tax liability, but such is the case if reimbursements for property exceed the
taxpayer’s investment in the property. For example, if an individual
purchased a painting for $100,000 many years ago and receives $300,000
reduction in commuting costs. Treas. Reg. § 1.123-1(b)(4) Ex. 1. Professor Lipman
has noted that even though these provisions are strict on their face “in practice they
may have little application. Homeowner’s insurance coverage generally only
reimburses a homeowner for additional living expenses, which is defined
consistently with the exclusion provision.” Lipman, supra note 181, at 984-85.
325
I.R.S. TECH. ADV. MEM. 200114045 (Mar. 29, 2001).
326
Id.
327
See NAT’L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM, National Flood Insurance Program
Summary of Coverage, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/residential_co
verage/whats_covered.jsp.
328
See supra Part V.A.1.
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in insurance proceeds for the painting, the individual would recognize
$200,000 of casualty gain. The Code permits taxpayers to elect to defer
paying taxes on such casualty gains by purchasing replacement property.329
The replacement property must be “similar or related in service or use” to
the original, destroyed property.330 The gain is deferred rather than
completely excluded by treating the taxpayer as though his investment in
the replacement property is carried over from the destroyed property.331
As discussed above, property purchased as part of a hazard
mitigation program is eligible for deferral of any gain on the sale.332 A
special rule also applies to principal residences that are “compulsorily or
involuntarily converted as a result of a Presidentially declared disaster”333:
taxpayers receive a full exclusion for insurance proceeds received for
unscheduled property without the need to purchase replacement property.334
The extent to which household contents are treated as unscheduled property
will depend on the particular insurance contract. In general, only assets of
relatively high value (e.g., jewelry, artwork) will be separately scheduled,
and all other household property will be treated as a single asset.335 The
329

I.R.C. § 1033 (2006).
I.R.C. §§ 1033(a)(1)-(2). See BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 30.03[3]-[5] (3d ed. & 2010 cumulative supplement)
(discussing this requirement).
331
I.R.C. § 1033(b).
332
See supra Part V.A.2.
333
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1) (2006). The definition for principal residence is tied to
section 121 through a cross-reference, although a home may qualify even if rented
rather than owned. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(4). See supra Part IV.B.
Section 121, which provides a generous exclusion for gain on the sale of a
principal residence if various eligibility requirements are met, may also be
available. I.R.C. § 121(d)(5) (amount realized on involuntary conversion of
principal residence is reduced by amount of section 121 exclusion).
Because sales pursuant to a hazard mitigation program are not in response to a
federally declared disaster but are instead aimed at lessening future losses,
presumably Code section 1033(h)(1) does not apply to mitigation sales. A special
rule expanding the scope of qualifying replacement property also applies to trade,
business, or investment property converted as a result of a federally declared
disaster. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(2).
334
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006). See also Rev. Rul. 95-22, 1995-1 C.B.
145.
335
See Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145(containing example situation in
which general household furnishings were unscheduled while jewelry and sterling
silverware were separately scheduled). The IRS Chief Counsel has advised in an
informal memorandum that the exclusion will apply even to property not kept at
330
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principal residence (if owned) and any separately scheduled contents are
treated as a single asset for purposes of calculating gain and applying the
deferral provision.336 In addition, the replacement property may be anything
“which is similar or related in service or use to the residence so
converted”— or its contents.337
Thus, for example, consider a taxpayer whose rented residence and
its contents are destroyed in a federally declared disaster and who receives
$40,000 of insurance proceeds for unscheduled household items and
$10,000 for scheduled jewelry. All $40,000 of the proceeds received for the
unscheduled household items will be excluded from income even if no
replacement property is purchased.338 If the taxpayer originally purchased
the jewelry for $8,000, the $2,000 gain arising from the $10,000 insurance
payment can be deferred through purchase of $10,000 of replacement
property. The replacement property may be jewelry but it may also be any
household-related item — e.g., linens, dishes, furniture.339
These provisions should be expanded to cover all flood-related
reimbursement received under the proposed program. Coverage for
personal possessions would be treated as payment for unscheduled property
and thus any gain would be excluded from income. The exclusion for gain
resulting from reimbursement for unscheduled property is not, however, as
generous as it appears on its face. That is because it will be relatively rare
for a taxpayer to have a gain for typical, unscheduled household
furnishings, which generally go down in value after purchase. If insurance
the principal residence so long as the property was covered by the contract and was
lost in the federally declared disaster (e.g., property in a car). I.R.S. TECH. ADV.
MEM. 200114046 (Apr. 2, 2001).
336
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2006). Presumably the section 121
adjustment would apply to this aggregated asset, assuming the other qualifications
of section 121 are met. I.R.C. § 121(d)(5). The adjustment reduces the amount
realized from insurance by the amount excluded under section 121. Thus, for
example, if $700,000 is received under an insurance contract for a qualifying
principal residence by a couple filing a joint return, section 1033 is applied as
though only $200,000 of insurance proceeds were received. I.R.C. § 121(a)-(b),
(d)(5).
337
I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(A)(ii)(II). The time for purchasing the replacement
property is also increased from two to four years. I.R.C. § 1033(h)(1)(B).
338
Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145 (no gain recognized “upon the receipt of
insurance proceeds for unscheduled contents destroyed in such a disaster,
regardless of the use to which the taxpayer puts those proceeds”).
339
See Rev. Rul. 95-22 1995-1 C.B. 145 (“[A]ny type of replacement contents
(whether separately scheduled or unscheduled)” qualifies as replacement property
for separately scheduled contents).
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proceeds are insufficient to reimburse a taxpayer for his investment in the
property, the taxpayer will have a loss. For example, if a taxpayer
purchased an asset for $10,000 but receives only a $6,000 insurance
recovery, the taxpayer has $4,000 tax loss. Whether such a loss is or
should be deductible is considered below.
C. UNREIMBURSED LOSSES
Losses that arise from the disposition of personal-use assets are
generally nondeductible.340 Taxpayers may, however, take a limited
deduction if the loss is caused by a casualty event or theft and is not
compensated for by insurance or through some other means.341 The
calculation of the casualty loss deduction is complex and requires a series
of steps, each of which potentially serves to limit the size of a deduction.342
340

I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2006).
Whether an event constitutes a casualty event or theft loss is itself a
difficult issue to resolve. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 330, at ¶¶ 24.02-.03;
BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 288, at 530-33.
342
First, the amount of the loss is limited to the lesser of the taxpayer’s
investment in the asset or the decline in value of the asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.1657(b)(1). Thus, for example, if a taxpayer spent $10,000 for an asset but the asset
was worth only $7,000 when it was destroyed in a flood, the amount of the
potential casualty loss would be limited to $7,000. Second, the loss is reduced by
the extent to which an individual receives compensation for the loss (whether
through insurance or otherwise). I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d).
If the taxpayer received $6,000 in insurance proceeds, his potential casualty loss
deduction would be further reduced to $1,000.
Third, the Code disallows the first $100 of casualty loss stemming from a
casualty event or theft. In the case of the example, the taxpayer’s potential casualty
loss deduction would be reduced to $900. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1). This $100 amount
was temporarily raised to $500 during 2009. Tax Extenders and Alternative
Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, Division C, § 706(c), 122 Stat.
3921-3923.
Fourth, the sustained casualty losses for the year are aggregated and applied
first against the aggregate of any casualty gains for the year. I.R.C. §
165(h)(2)(A)(i). For example, if the taxpayer has a $400 gain resulting from an
unrelated theft, only $500 would remain as the net casualty loss. If the taxpayer
elects to defer the gain under section 1033, then the casualty gain is not included in
this netting calculation.
Finally, once the net casualty loss amount is determined, casualty losses are
only deductible to the extent they exceed 10% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii). Thus, if a taxpayer has a $500 potential casualty
341
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For example, losses are only deductible to the extent they exceed ten
percent of adjusted gross income; thus, only relatively large casualty losses
are deductible as a practical matter. In addition, because the casualty loss
deduction is an itemized deduction, the value of the deduction will increase
with higher rate brackets and also will not be available to those who use the
standard deduction rather than itemize.343 The ten-percent-of-adjustedgross-income threshold may, however, still place the deduction out of reach
for individuals with high taxable income. During 2008 and 2009,344
casualty losses caused by a federally declared disaster were less limited as
to amount345 and could also be used without the need to itemize.346
The deduction for casualty losses should be significantly limited, if
not eliminated, for flood losses.347 The deduction creates a shadow system
loss deduction, and the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $5,000 or more, no
casualty loss deduction will be permitted.
Even if an amount of net casualty loss remained over the 10% floor, the
taxpayer would only get the benefit of the deduction by electing to itemize his
deductions rather than taking the standard deduction. I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c) (2006). In
2011, the standard deduction for a taxpayer filing as single will be $5,800; for head
of household, $8,500; and for married filing joint, $11,600.
343
For example, at the margin, a $1,000 deduction is worth $350 to someone
in a 35% rate bracket but only $200 to someone in a 20% bracket.
344
I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B)(i)(I); Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, Division C, § 706122 Stat. 3921-3923. A similar
measure was also in place in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-73, § 402. See Aprill
& Schmalbeck, supra note 219, at 59-60 (discussing temporary change to section
165 for 2005 hurricane season losses).
Legislative proposals have been made to extend or make permanent the
standard deduction increase for net disaster losses. See H.R. 5273, 111th Cong.
(2010); H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010); and H.R. 4052, 111th Cong. (2009).
345
They were not limited by the ten-percent floor. I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(A)
(2006). Currently, a taxpayer who experiences casualty losses as the result of a
federally declared disaster may elect to deduct the casualty losses on the tax return
for the year preceding the disaster. I.R.C. § 165(i). See also supra note 314
(discussing § 165(k)). Personal casualty losses are not carried forward so if there is
not enough income to soak up the casualty loss, any tax benefit to be obtained from
the deduction would be lost. A taxpayer whose income fell as a result of the
federally declared disaster could use the election to move the deduction to a year in
which the taxpayer had income against which to offset the deduction.
346
The Code section did so by increasing the standard deduction. I.R.C. §
63(c)(2) (2006).
347
Sorting costs would need to be taken into account. See Levmore & Logue,
supra note 4, at 321-22 (discussing sorting costs that would result from
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of government reimbursement for flood loss, but one that offers patchy,
difficult-to-understand coverage.348 Individuals may overestimate its
benefits, which may in turn contribute to less care with respect to purchase
decisions.349 For example, a relatively wealthy individual may purchase a
$400,000 beach house, purchase the maximum NFIP policy on the home,
and assume that the remaining $150,000 loss would be deductible should
the home be destroyed in a flood. But if the individual’s adjusted gross
income were $750,000, only approximately half of the $150,000 loss would
be deductible.350 As discussed in Part III, flood loss is difficult for
individuals to conceptualize, so the effect of this shadow system may be
relatively small. At the same time, individuals who itemize and who have
the ability to purchase that second vacation home may be particularly
tempted to believe that there is little personal downside to such a purchase
given the combination of the NFIP and the casualty loss deduction.
Eliminating the casualty loss deduction for flood-related costs
altogether would, however, likely be politically impractical. One possible
compromise would be to allow the loss deduction but only for flood losses
occurring at the principal residence and only for a limited dollar amount.
The deduction should be accessible even those who do not itemize, and the
ten-percent floor and other limitations should be lifted to provide greater
certainty about the amount to be deducted. For example, the deduction
could be limited to the loss in excess of the purchased coverage and up to
an additional $50,000 for personal property and $125,000 for structural
damage (these amounts are one-half the proposed coverage maximums).
If, however, eligible coverage has been phased out for a structure because
of repetitive claims, the loss deduction should be commensurately reduced.
Elimination of the casualty loss deduction as to second homes and to a
portion of the cost of more expensive homes would still be controversial,

government-sponsored crime insurance that did not cover terrorism). The same
casualty may trigger flood loss, windstorm loss, or possibly even fire loss. In many
cases, the presence of private insurance could simplify the inquiry. For example,
the Code could treat private insurance recoveries as being for losses other than
flood and assigning any residual loss as flood loss.
348
See Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and
Medical Expense Deductions and The Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums,
79 CAL. L.R. 1485 (1991). See also supra Part III.B (discussing difficulties
individuals face in processing flood loss probability and calculating assistance).
349
See Kaplow, supra note 10.
350
Ten percent of $750,000 is $75,000. The deductible amount would be
$74,900 -- $150,000 minus $100 minus $75,000.
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but the program goals of providing a social safety net while limiting
repetitive loss would be better served.
VI. CONCLUSION
Use of tax system components to implement social programs
should not be lightly undertaken. In the case of flood loss mitigation, the
government already plays a central function through both the NFIP and
various tax provisions already in place. Moving flood loss coverage under
the umbrella of the tax law could yield significant benefits, including
increased program efficiencies and better tools for balancing competing
land use goals. Most importantly, a national flood security system would be
a means of providing the least fortunate with a safety net when (not if) the
next unimaginable flood occurs.

